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ARTICLE
RETIREMENT REVOLUTION: UNMITIGATED
RISKS IN THE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION
SOCIETY
Anne Tucker∗
ABSTRACT
A revolution in the retirement landscape over the last
several decades shifted the predominant savings vehicle from
traditional pensions (defined benefit plans) to self-directed
accounts in defined contribution plans like the 401(k) and has
drastically changed how people invest in the stock market and
why. The prevalence of these self-directed accounts has created
our defined contribution society and a new class of investors—the
citizen shareholders—who enter the private securities market
through self-directed retirement plans, invest for long-term
savings goals, and are predominately indirect shareholders. With
90 million Americans invested in mutual funds, and nearly 75
million who do so through defined contribution plans, citizen
shareholders are the fastest growing group of investors. Yet,
citizen shareholders have the least protections despite
conventional wisdom that corporate law and ERISA protections
safeguard both these investors and their investments. As
explained in an earlier paper, citizen shareholders do not fit
neatly within the traditional corporate law framework because
their investment within a defined contribution plan restricts
choice and their indirect ownership status dilutes their
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information and voting rights, as well as exacerbates their
rational apathy as diffuse and disempowered “owners.”
The retirement revolution from pensions to 401(k) has
changed not only how individuals prepare for retirement but also
who bears certain risks that affect the retirement nest egg.
Under self-directed defined contribution plans, but not defined
benefit plans, citizen shareholders bear the risks of poor market
performance, longevity, and information asymmetries, as well as
plan administrative costs and life-long responsibility of asset
management. Research indicates that citizen shareholders,
particularly those who are women, minorities, and those with
lower education levels, often lack the financial literacy necessary
to maximize both individual and society-wide retirement savings.
These changes, and their consequences, are firmly established in
our defined contribution society and are a result of the
retirement revolution. Yet, these changes are not widely
understood by individuals saving for retirement, nor have they
been incorporated into how we think and talk about shareholders
in and outside of the academy. In this Article, I build on previous
work, which articulated the citizen shareholder status and its
incompatibility with traditional corporate law, by identifying and
explaining the second prong—that citizen shareholders have
substantially weakened protections under ERISA and bear
substantially increased risks and responsibility in our defined
contribution society. I suggest that these risks could be better
managed and mitigated through a series of structural and
individually focused reforms.
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INTRODUCTION

For young workers, saving for retirement is an unpleasant
eventuality that promises stress and poses future risks far too
great to imagine today. Little changes as workers age—
retirement still feels far off and many intervening events have
yet to occur. With thirty years to accumulate a nest egg and the
hope for future increased savings or a booming stock market,
workers tend to save too little, generally pay inadequate
attention to retirement planning, and raid accumulated savings
even though these actions have tremendous potential for
personal detriment. The average 401(k) balance is $80,9001 while
the average for workers reaching retirement age is $200,000.2
1. Ashlea Ebeling, Fidelity: 401(k) Balances Reach Record Highs, FORBES (May 23,
2013, 2:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2013/05/23/fidelity-401kbalances-reach-record-highs/.
2. INV. CO. INST., 2013 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 121 (53d ed. 2013),
available at http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2013_factbook.pdf (reflecting the average
savings of workers over age sixty who have been with their current employer for thirty
years or more). The reader should note that the number is reported as an average, which
can be skewed by high earners with substantial accumulated savings, and it is not the
mode, which reflects the most common occurring account balance.

Do Not Delete

156

9/22/2013 2:49 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[51:1

While not an insignificant amount of savings, it is insufficient to
meet most modest estimates of retirement savings needs when
variables such as life expectancy, market volatility, and longterm care costs are taken into account.3
The average American employee saving for retirement does
so through investments pooled in an individual account found in
4
self-directed defined contribution plans, like the 401(k)—the
subject of this Article. The growing ubiquity of these self-directed
retirement accounts gave birth to the retirement revolution and
the resulting defined contribution society,5 where the majority of
individual retirement savings are invested in private securities
markets.
The retirement revolution promoted self-directed defined
contribution plans, provided workers flexibility in the type of risk
6
exposure they choose, and facilitated greater job mobility. For
most workers, long gone are the days of weighing alternative job
3. Dan Kadlec, Sizing Up the Big Question: How Much Money Do You Need to
Retire?, TIME (Feb. 11, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/02/11/sizing-up-the-bigquestion-how-much-money-do-you-need-to-retire/ (stating that due to factors such as life
expectancy, medical costs, and inflation, “by age 65 an average full time career worker
needs to have banked 11 times annual pay. . . . [meaning] a household earning $75,000 a
year would need to have saved $825,000”).
4. Alicia H. Munnell, Employer-Sponsored Plans: The Shift from Defined Benefit to
Defined Contribution, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT INCOME 359,
365–66 (Gordon L. Clark et al. eds., 2006). Common defined contribution plans include
Money Purchase plans, Target Benefit plans, Profit Sharing plans, 401(k) plans, Stock
Bonus plans and Employee Stock Ownership plans. See generally Phyllis C. Borzi, ERISA:
A Basic Approach to Key Terms and Concepts Under Title I of ERISA, in 1 ERISA BASICS,
at A-9, A-16 (ABA ed., 2011). The distinguishing feature of self-directed defined
contribution plans, which is the subject of this paper, is that employers provide separate
benefit accounts that the plan maintains for each participant. BARRY KOZAK, EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT PLANS 84–85 (2010). Participants direct the investment allocation in these
accounts and employers may provide a matching or minimum level of contribution to the
account
as
well.
See,
e.g.,
403(b)
Plan
Basics,
IRS
(Feb.
2013),
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p571/ch01.html; IRC 457(b) Deferred Compensation Plans,
IRS
(Feb.
2013),
http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/IRC-457(b)-DeferredCompensation-Plans (describing how contributions are made to the plan). At retirement,
a participant’s retirement benefits are limited to the amount in the account. KOZAK,
supra, at 86. 403(b) plans, available for employees of public schools, employees of certain
tax-exempt organizations, and certain ministers, and 457 plans, available for certain state
and local governments and nongovernmental entities tax exempt under IRC 501, are also
self-directed accounts. 403(b) Plan Basics, supra; IRC 457(b) Deferred Compensation
Plans, supra.
5. “In a defined contribution society, the policies more likely to be adopted are
those that channel government subsidies through individual accounts controlled by the
taxpayer herself.” Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE
L.J. 451, 453 (2004).
6. See ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUNDÉN, COMING UP SHORT: THE
CHALLENGE OF 401(K) PLANS 16, 19 (2004) (discussing the shift of responsibility from
employers to employees and that, once vested, an employee will not forfeit benefits when
changing employers).
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opportunities against lost retirement income under traditional
defined benefit plans, referred to as pensions.7 In defined benefit
plans, employers sponsored, funded, managed, and paid
guaranteed benefits upon retirement, often for the life of the
employee.8 In self-directed defined contribution plans, employers
provide investment portals for employees to contribute money,
often matched by employers, into individual accounts that are
invested by the employee in employer-chosen investment
instruments.9 I discuss the distinctions between the two regimes,
and the consequences of each, in detail in the following pages. It
may be useful at the outset to think of defined benefit regulations
as focused on outputs—employers guaranteeing retirement
payments—whereas regulations governing self-directed defined
contribution plans are focused on inputs—employers facilitating
employee savings and investment for retirement.
Unless you are already retired, you are, or will soon be,
saving for retirement like the 92.4 million Americans invested in
mutual funds,10 nearly 75 million of whom do so through defined
contribution plans.11 “Assets in employer-sponsored DC plans
have grown more rapidly than assets in other types
12
of . . . retirement plans over the past quarter century . . . .”
401(k)s and other employer-sponsored defined contribution plans
held over $5 trillion in assets at the end of 2012.13 The result is a
retirement revolution that has resulted in a defined contribution
society, where increasingly the average worker saves for
retirement by investing in private securities markets and
14
becoming a shareholder.

7.
Id. at 15–16, 40–41.
8.
See infra Part II.B.1.
9.
See infra Part II.B.1–3; see also Borzi, supra note 4, at A-15 to A-16
(describing defined contribution plans under ERISA).
10.
INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 91.
11.
Private Pension Plan Bulletin: Abstract of 2010 Form 5500 Annual Reports,
U.S.
DEP’ T
OF
L ABOR
1
(Nov.
2012),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/PDF/2010pensionplanbulletin.pdf (summarizing 2010 data
regarding the number of current defined contribution participants). The 75 million
figure reflects current participants and does not include former participants who
have changed jobs or retired and converted accumulated defined contribution benefits
into an individual savings account (IRA).
12.
INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 116.
13.
Id. at 94.
14.
See Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 453–54.
In a defined contribution society, the policies more likely to be adopted are
those that channel government subsidies through individual accounts
controlled by the taxpayer herself. . . . As a result of the increasing
prevalence of defined-contribution-type programs, upper-middle-class
taxpayers can in practice undertake all of their financial savings for
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This
growing
class
of
investors—the
“citizen
shareholders”—have commonalities in how they enter the
15
market, in what they invest, and why. This Article is the
second of three pieces examining the evolving ways in which
Americans invest and the causes and consequences of such
changes. The first article articulated the early concept of the
citizen shareholder, a definition that is refined and focused in
this paper, as investors, who enter the securities market
primarily through self-directed defined contribution plans,16
invest in mutual or index funds and are saving for long-term
goals like retirement. Because citizen shareholders invest in
private securities markets through employer plans, their
investments are governed by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA),17 in addition to traditional corporate
governance and securities statutes.18
The commonalities of how citizen shareholders enter the
market, the constraints on their ownership rights, and the
long-term time horizon of their investments distinguish them
from both direct shareholders, who hold shares in individual
retirement, education, and health outlays through tax-favored individual
account devices.
Id.
15. Anne Tucker, The Citizen Shareholder: Modernizing the Agency Paradigm to
Reflect How and Why a Majority of Americans Invest in the Market, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
1299, 1302–06 (2012) (describing the changing landscape of individual securities
investment and the resulting category of citizen shareholders). Delaware Chancellor Leo
Strine has termed these investors the “forced capitalists”:
[M]ost ordinary Americans have little choice but to invest in the market. They
are in essence ‘forced capitalists,’ even though they continue to depend for their
economic security on their ability to sell their labor and to have access to quality
jobs. These forced capitalists—in whose number I count myself—invest
primarily for two purposes, both of which are long-term in focus: to send their
children to college and to provide for themselves in retirement.
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate
Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (2007).
16. Citizen shareholders enter the market through employer-sponsored retirement
plans, but when they reach retirement age the plan accumulations will be rolled into
privately held, but often still, mutual or index funds. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1314.
Additionally, citizen shareholders may supplement plan holdings by purchasing
additional securities as a retail investor—someone who purchases mutual or direct funds
outside of an employer-sponsored plan. Id. at 1301 n.9. The classification of citizen
shareholder is still meaningful, however, as it describes how investors enter the market,
their primary purpose, and the conditions upon which they first invest.
17. KOZAK, supra note 4, at 297.
18. Part III will provide a brief overview of corporate governance and securities
regulations limitations for citizen shareholders. These issues, however, are largely beyond
the scope of this paper and will instead be addressed in a third article tracking the
consequences of the change in how investors enter the market, the protections available
and the risks assumed.
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companies, and indirect investors, who own shares in
investment companies like mutual and index funds.19
20
The defined contribution society has created a growing class
of citizen shareholders who do not fit neatly into the traditional
21
corporate law governance structure. Much of the corporate law
22
literature and doctrine remains focused on the direct shareholder,
a significant group in terms of investing volume, but a group that is
not representative of the 92.4 million indirect, mutual fund owners
23
in the securities market. Direct shareholders own stock in
individual companies such as Coca-Cola or Facebook and exercise
shareholder information, voting, and exit rights directly.24 In
contrast, citizen shareholders own stock in mutual or index funds
that are made up of stock from hundreds of companies, and on
whose behalf representatives, like mutual fund managers, utilize
25
shareholder information and exercise voting and exit rights.
Mutual and index funds, as well as hedge funds, are investment
companies.26 They, together with pension funds, such as CalPERS,
are referred to as intermediaries in this Article and also as
institutional shareholders in corporate law literature.27 In teaching
and thinking about corporate law, I use the following simple
19. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1309.
20. “There were 20,035 [defined benefit] plans and 8,587 [defined contribution]
plans with more than 100 participants in 1975, but only 11,368 [defined benefit] plans
and 70,125 [defined contribution] plans with more than 100 participants in 2006.” Martin
Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON HALL L. REV.
909, 923 (2013). In 2012, $5,057 billion was invested in defined contribution plans such as
401(k), 403(b), 457, and other plans. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 117.
21. Corporate law is an umbrella term under which we examine the role and rights
of direct shareholders, indirect shareholders, and the institutional shareholders.
Similarly, both publically owned and privately owned companies are also examined under
the heading of corporate law.
22. See, e.g., Larry Cata Backer, Direct Shareholder Democracy: Reflections on
Lucian Bebchuck, 2 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV. 376 (2006); Elizabeth J. Thompson,
Direct Harm, Special Injury, or Duty Owed: Which Test Allows for the Most Shareholder
Success in Direct Shareholder Litigation?, 35 J. CORP. L. 215 (2009).
23. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 91.
24. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1321–29 (describing the consequences of indirect stock
ownership with respect to traditional shareholder rights).
25. As is briefly discussed in Part III and the subsequent paper, representation by
these managers does not cure the defect because their interests are not perfectly aligned
with those of citizen shareholders. Id. at 1324.
26. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE AND PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, REPORT TO
THE HONORABLE HILDA L. SOLIS, U.S. SECRETARY OF LABOR, HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE
EQUITY INVESTMENTS 9 (2011), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2011ACReport3.
pdf.
27. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of
Ownership from Control, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 877, 880, 882 (2010) (describing mutual
funds as diversified institutional shareholders); CalPERS, Facts at a Glance 1 (Sept.
2013),
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/facts/facts-at-a-glance.pdf
(reporting
average monthly pension information).
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diagram to visualize b
both the distinct roles of these various groups
and the relationship beetween them.

This diagram illu
ustrates one way to think about the changing
roles and rights of sha
areholders as they move from direct through
intermediaries to indiirect shareholders and between public and
private companies. F
Fundamental shareholder rights such as
information and votin
ng rights remain constant between private
and publically owned corporations, and yet there are significant
distinctions between tthe two in terms of exit rights such as the
ready market to selll shares that is available in most public
corporations, but usua
ally not with private corporations.28 Another
important area of disstinction is the ability for shareholders to
exercise meaningful v
voting rights. The smaller pool of owners in
private corporations teends to make voting rights more meaningful
than with public coompanies, which often have millions of
outstanding shares and shareholders. In a prior article, I
highlighted the fixatioon of corporate law on the direct shareholder
in public companies; that limited sphere is illustrated below in
quadrant number 1. In
n this Article, I examine the unique needs of
citizen shareholders who occupy both quadrants 3 and 4, but
predominantly focus oon quadrant 3 as indirect investors primarily
in public companies.29
28. E.g., Tucker, supra n
note 15, at 1304 (describing the importance of exit rights).
29. Participants in self-directed defined contribution plans can invest in private
equity and hedge funds in on
ne of three ways. The first is if he or she qualifies as an
accredited investor or as a qu
ualified purchaser and then can invest directly in the hedge
or private equity fund. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7) (2006) (defining “accredited
investor” and “qualified purch
haser”). Second, a participant may invest in a fund and the
fund invests in private equity and hedge funds so that the participant is an indirect owner
and the fund a qualified purrchaser or accredited investor. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP.
WELFARE AND PENSION BENE
EFIT PLANS, supra note 26, at 9. Third, participants in selfdirected defined contribution plans “may have exposure to hedge funds and/or private
equity funds when the plan in
ncludes as part of its investments options target-date funds,
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While corporate law, securities regulations,30 and the
Employee Retirementt Income Security Act (ERISA)31 govern
retirement investmen
nts, the protections offered under these
frameworks are largely obsolete for citizen shareholders.32 And yet,
their retirement inveestments perform an individually crucial
function of providing
g financial solvency in retirement and a
socially vital function
n of preserving the retirement safety net.
There is little schola
arship exploring the relationship between
33
corporate law, securitiies law principles, and ERISA; this Article
lifecycle funds or other manag
ged funds which may invest a portion of their assets in hedge
funds and/or private equity fu
unds.” Id.
30. Part III will provid
de a brief overview of corporate governance and securities
regulations limitations for citiizen shareholders. These issues, however, are largely beyond
the scope of this paper and will instead be addressed in a third article tracking the
consequences of the change in
n how investors enter the market, the protections available
and the risks assumed.
31. Certain plans that m
mimic defined benefit and defined contribution plans are not
“qualified plans” under ERISA
A and therefore are not subject to certain ERISA regulations
on funding and vesting. Borzi,, supra note 4, at A-17. These plans include benefits offered by
the government, public schools,, nonprofit corporations, and church plans that do not opt-in to
ERISA; plans established undeer workmen’s compensation, disability, or unemployment laws;
plans outside of the United Sta
ates; and excess benefit plans only offered to certain employees.
29 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006); KOZAK
K, supra note 4, at 51–61. Employer sponsors who are outside of
the scope of ERISA and thus ca
annot offer qualified plans have alternative tax-deferred savings
options available through Interrnal Revenue Code § 457(b) for government, church, and nonprofit employers and §§ 403(a)–
–(b) for schools, churches and nonprofit organizations. KOZAK,
supra note 4, at 47–48; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1103(b) (declaring exceptions to § 1103(a)).
32. Tucker, supra note 15
5, at 1324. See generally Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing:
The Failure of Mutual Fund Ad
dvisors to Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 843
(2009) (discussing the failure off corporate law to protect mutual fund investors, the majority of
which meet the definition of a ciitizen shareholder).
33. For a general overview
w of the existing literature on the retirement revolution and the
resulting changes in the corpora
ate governance framework, see the following sources: MUNNELL
& SUNDÉN, supra note 6, att 65, which describes the risks and limitations of defined
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highlights where these regulatory frameworks overlap and
examines how the defined contribution society shifts risks onto the
citizen shareholder under ERISA. A future article will focus on the
structural problems with corporate and securities law.34 The
shifting risks of market performance, longevity, and information
have potential to impact retirement security. These risks,
however, are neither readily apparent to participants nor fully
understood and are risks that can be better managed once we
accept the reality, dominance, and import of the citizen
shareholder.35
The remainder of this Article is organized in five parts. I
document the historical and regulatory genesis for the rise of selfdirected defined contribution plans and provide a brief overview of
ERISA in Part II. In Part III, I briefly summarize the alienation of
citizen shareholders from traditional corporate law rights, as
36
described in earlier works, and securities regulations setting up
inquiries, which will be the focus of the third article. In Part IV, I
describe the fundamental shifting of risks to employees and
retirees under the defined contribution framework. In Part V, I
discuss the limitations of diluted fiduciary standards and
oversight of self-directed defined contribution plans. Part VI offers
concluding observations about the overlap of the regulatory
frameworks and their insufficiencies to serve the interests of
citizen shareholders. It also offers initial suggestions for structural
and individual reforms.
II. EVOLVING INVESTMENT IN THE RETIREMENT REVOLUTION
Citizen shareholders are the consequence of a retirement
revolution, and they are also a potential catalyst for corporate law
37
reform. Changes in tax and retirement benefit laws under ERISA
contribution plans, while focusing in particular on investor financial illiteracy and the
consequences on savings; Fisch, supra note 27, at 879–80, which provides a detailed analysis of
indirect investors and their limited role in traditional corporate governance mechanisms;
Gelter, supra note 20, at 911–12, which describes the relationship between defined
contribution plans increasing the number of investors and the role of markets to push the
dominance of shareholder primacy; Colleen E. Medill, Transforming the Role of the Social
Security Administration, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 329–31 (2007), which criticizes investor
education given the role of self-directed retirement savings and the responsibilities placed on
individual investors; and Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 455, 458, 473, which notes the rise of the
defined contribution society, the difference between defined benefit and defined contribution
plans, the shifting risks with defined contribution plans, and the tax consequences.
34. See generally Anne M. Tucker, The Outside Investor: Citizen Shareholders &
Corporate Law Alienation, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. (forthcoming 2013).
35. See infra Part IV.
36. See Tucker, supra note 15, at 1308; supra note 34.
37. See infra Part III.
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created and promoted self-directed defined contribution plans,
like the 401(k), which funneled investors into private
securities markets.38 Self-directed defined contribution plans
are the dominant vehicles of individual retirement savings and
have created both a growing class of employees who invest in
capital markets and a resulting defined contribution society.39
Payments from self-directed defined contribution plans are based
exclusively on the accumulation of contributions (from employees
and any employer-matching contributions) and investment earnings
40
in individual accounts. Corporate and securities laws thus govern
the rights of these investments in private securities markets.41
Employers provide access to markets through sponsored-benefit
42
plans, so investors also fall within the regulatory framework of
ERISA.43 The proliferation of the defined contribution plan, and
thus the citizen shareholder status, is due in part to the regulatory
44
evolution of ERISA since it was enacted in the 1970s. This Part
provides an overview of ERISA and documents the role ERISA
regulations played in creating and continuing the defined
contribution trend.
A. ERISA: History and Purpose
ERISA, signed into law on Labor Day in 1974,45 was the
first comprehensive employee benefit legislation in response to
abuses46 of employer and union retirement plans,47 including
38. See JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974:
A POLITICAL HISTORY 278–79 (2004) (discussing the shift from defined benefit plans to defined
contribution plans after ERISA was enacted).
39. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 471–72; see INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 114–15
(examining the increase in assets in defined contribution plans).
40. I.R.C. § 414(i) (2006); KOZAK, supra note 4, at 79.
41. See, e.g., Borzi, supra note 4, at A-12 (stating ERISA “grants substantive rights to
employees and their beneficiaries”).
42. Throughout this Article, employer sponsors of defined contribution plans are
referred to as “employers.”
43. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified in part at 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2006)).
44. WOOTEN, supra note 38, at 278.
45. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified in part at 29 U.S.C. § 1002).
46. “Legislative materials dating to the enactment of ERISA thoroughly illustrate
congressional concern with protecting plan assets from malfeasance and misuse.
Representatives recognized the threat posed by the then-existing abuses of pension plan
assets.” Dana M. Muir, Fiduciary Status as an Employer’s Shield: The Perversity of ERISA
Fiduciary Law, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 398 (2000). ERISA replaced the first legislative
attempt to regulate pensions in the former attempt of the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure
Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 301–309 (1982), repealed by Pub. L. 93-406, Title I, § 111(a)(1), Sept. 2, 1974,
88 Stat. 851.
47. Retirement benefits are voluntary, but once they are promised and if they meet
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failure of large employers (or unions) to deliver the benefits
they had promised (whether due to economic reality,
negligence or malfeasance), improper use of plan assets,
inadequate advance funding, excessive periods of required
service as an employee before . . . a portion of the benefits was
vested . . . and the failure to cover a fair cross-section of lower48
paid employees.

The central purpose of ERISA was to “prevent the ‘great
personal traged[ies]’ of workers whose pension plans terminated
49
without having sufficient assets to pay promised benefits.”
Defined benefit plans—traditional pension plans where
retired employees received fixed-sum payments from employers
50
based on salary and years of service —were the predominant

the standards of a “qualified plan,” then they are subject to ERISA. Plans are classified
according to the type of benefit offered. Guaranteed payments provided by the employer after
retirement, usually based upon a formula of service years and salary, are called defined benefit
plans. When each employee funds separate retirement savings accounts, often comprised of
stock investments, by employee contributions and possibly matching contributions by the
employers, these plans fit the defined contribution model. Borzi, supra note 4, at A-15 to A-16.
ERISA plans are also categorized according to which entity or entities sponsor a plan. For
example, ERISA refers to the employer sponsor of the plan as either a single employer sponsor
(Single Employer Plan), an employee association sponsor (Multiemployer Plan, like a plan
offered under a collective bargaining agreement), or a multiple employer sponsor (Multiple
Employer Plan, usually a trade association or national union). Id. at A-14, A-19. ERISA,
however, also covers what is known as welfare benefit plans, which provide various health,
disability, and insurance benefits to employees. Id. at A-16 to A-17. Employee welfare plans are
outside of the scope of this Article.
48. KOZAK, supra note 4, at 28.
49. Muir, supra note 46, at 398.
The catalyst for the passage of the ERISA was the shutdown of the Studebaker
plant in South Bend, Indiana, in 1963, which left many employees without their
promised pension. After a decade of study by congressional committees, the
ERISA was introduced by liberal New York Republican Senator Jacob Javits,
signed into law by President Ford, and became effective on Labor Day,
September 2, 1974.
Neil A. Capobianco & José Martin Jara, Hot Topics in ERISA Litigation: From
Ongoing Class Action Challenges to the Upcoming Fee Disclosure Deluge, RECENT
CHANGES IN EMP. BENEFITS & EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, Jan. 2011, 2011 WL
190437, at *2. ERISA’s regulatory framework intended to balance protections to plan
participants against undue administrative burdens for (voluntary) employer
sponsors, as well as maintain plan flexibility. Legislative History of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 94th Cong. (2d Sess. 1976) (introductory
remarks of Sen. Javits, Member, S. Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare) (“[M]indful that
too much regulation . . . might discourage employers from offering plans, Congress
sought to balance ‘the interests of employers . . . in maintaining flexibility in the
design and operation of their pension programs and the need of the workers for a
level of protection which will adequately protect their rights and just expectations.”);
see also Medill, supra note 33, at 344–45.
50.
Munnell, supra note 4, at 365 (giving the example of 1.5% of final three-year
average pay for each year of service, which adds up to 30% of income for an employee
with a twenty-year employment history with the firm).
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form of retirement benefit at the time ERISA was enacted51 with
as many as 80% of employees enrolled in such plans.52 ERISA
regulations, therefore, focused on rules for funding, preserving,
53
and paying those guaranteed benefits. At ERISA’s inception
there were relatively few defined contribution plans, and none
were self-directed.54 Today, however, self-directed defined
contribution plans dominate the retirement benefit landscape,
giving rise to our defined contribution society.55 Defined
contribution plans involve employer promises to provide
56
individual accounts as a savings vehicle for retirement. These
plans include money purchase plans, target benefit plans, profit
sharing plans, stock bonus and employee stock ownership plans
(ESOPs), as well as self-directed plans like the 401(k), which are
the focus of this Article.57 Employee contributions are often
51. “The predominant form of private pension was the defined benefit (DB) plan,
under which an employee receives a pension of a specified amount upon retirement.”
Gelter, supra note 20, at 922; see MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 9 (“Technically,
ERISA’s provisions applied to both defined benefit and defined contribution plans. But the
main thrust of the legislation was on the defined benefit side.”); see also Steven Sass, The
Development of Employer Retirement Income Plans: From the Nineteenth Century to 1980,
in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT INCOME 76, 84 (Gordon L. Clark et
al. eds., 2007) (noting a “dramatic” expansion of coverage from 15% in 1940 to
approaching 50% in 1980).
52. WOOTEN, supra note 38, at 278.
53. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 402(c), 408 (2006); see also Zelinksy, supra note 5, at 475–77
(discussing ERISA regulations).
54. Gelter, supra note 20, at 923, 931; see also WOOTEN, supra note 38, at 279
(stating that 401(k)s did not exist prior to the enactment of ERISA).
55. Gelter, supra note 20, at 931.
56. Borzi, supra note 4, at A-15.
57. Money purchase plans require the employer to contribute a fixed percentage of
an employee’s salary to the participant’s account. Choosing a Retirement Plan: Money
Purchase Plan, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Choosing-a-Retirement-Plan:Money-Purchase-Plan (last updated Sept. 3, 2013). In target benefit plans, a form of
money purchase plans, employers contribute “to each participant’s account an amount
necessary to provide a target benefit specific in the plan.” Borzi, supra note 4, at A-16. “A
Profit Sharing Plan or Stock Bonus Plan is a defined contribution plan under which the
plan may provide, or the employer may determine, annually, how much will be
contributed to the plan (out of profits or otherwise). The plan contains a formula for
allocating to each participant a portion of each annual contribution.” Retirement Plans,
Benefits & Savings: Types of Retirement Plans, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/retirement/typesofplans.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
Stock bonus plans usually make contributions and distributions in the form of employer
stock. Borzi, supra note 4, at A-16.
This Article focuses on self-directed defined contribution plans like the 401(k).
Participants in a 401(k) “can elect to defer receiving a portion of their salary which is
instead contributed on their behalf, before taxes, to the 401(k) plan. Sometimes the
employer may match these contributions.” Retirement Plans, Benefits & Savings: Types of
Retirement Plans, supra. 401(k) plans are subject to special rules like contribution limits
and are sometimes offered in conjunction with profit-sharing plans. Borzi, supra note 4, at
A-16. In addition to 401(k) plans, there are also 403(b) plans for employees of public
schools and certain tax-exempt organizations, and certain ministers and 457 plans for
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invested in securities like mutual funds, and the savings
accumulated over the working life of the employee, along with
returns on the investment, are paid to the participant, usually in
a lump sum, after retirement.58
B. Influence of ERISA Changes
Regulatory and social influences over the several decades
since the enactment of ERISA contributed to the proliferation of
defined contribution plans.59 A main source of regulatory
influence came from ERISA, both as originally conceived and
through the almost forty amendments to it since 1974.60 Four key
structural changes to ERISA started the trend toward the
61
defined contribution society that we have today. These changes
include (1) the creation of the individual retirement account
(IRA), (2) the heavier regulatory burden imposed on defined
benefit plans, (3) reduced fiduciary standards for self-directed
accounts, and (4) relaxed company stock holding rules in defined
contribution plans.62 Each of these factors is discussed in more
detail below. These four factors created three direct consequences
that are the building blocks of my argument. The first is that
these changes set in motion the decline of the defined benefit and
the rise of the defined contribution plan. The second is that selfdirected plans, like the 401(k), became the dominant retirement
vehicle, based in part on the successful model provided by IRAs.
Third, participants in self-directed accounts rely heavily upon
mutual and index funds as investment options thus increasing
their market significance and the number of indirect investors.
“certain state and local governments and non-governmental entities tax exempt under
IRC 501.” 403(b) Plan Basics, supra note 4; IRC 457(b) Deferred Compensation Plans,
supra note 4.
58. KOZAK, supra note 4, at 86. The lump-sum distributions are generally rolled
over into self-directed IRA accounts or annuities to provide income distributions over
retirement. See, e.g., Sumit Agarwal et al., The Age of Reason: Financial Decisions over
the Life Cycle and Implications for Regulations, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY,
Fall 2009, at 51, 53–54, 85 (discussing the common practice of rolling over retirement
benefits into a private IRA).
59. In addition to the factors discussed in this Part, other contributing factors to the
decline in the defined benefit plan are the decline of unions and the manufacturing
industry. “[A] good predictor of whether a firm sponsors a defined benefit plan is whether
it has a collective bargaining agreement. Another good predictor of defined benefit
sponsorship (often overlapping with union membership) is whether the firm is engaged in
traditional manufacturing or extractive activity.” Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 480.
60. KOZAK, supra note 4, at 35–37; JOHN H. LANGBEIN, DAVID A. PRATT & SUSAN J.
STABILE, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 98–104 (2010) (describing forty-three
post-1974 amendments and enactments that have affected ERISA’s scope).
61. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 471.
62. Id. at 471–72.
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From these three consequences the citizen shareholders and the
defined contribution society were born.
1. Regulatory Burdens in Defined Benefit Plans. The
restrictive regulatory environment of defined benefit plans
spurred growth of the current defined contribution society.63
Regulatory burdens on defined benefit plans unintentionally
created incentives for employer sponsors to shift from defined
benefit plans to defined contribution plans to avoid the additional
costs and liabilities associated with pension funding
responsibilities.64 The regulatory burden of plan administration
and financing was “particularly pronounced for small plans; over
the period of 1981–96 administrative costs as a percentage of
payroll nearly tripled for defined benefit plans . . . .”65 Regulatory
burdens imposed on defined benefit plans, but not defined
contribution plans, include: (a) minimum funding requirements,
(b) mandatory vesting standards, (c) contributions to the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), and (d) extensive
fiduciary duties on trustees managing plan assets.66 These
requirements reduced employer flexibility in managing defined
benefit plans—flexibility that remains available with defined
67
contribution plans.
The difference in regulatory burdens between defined benefit
and defined contribution plans exemplifies the fundamental
difference between these two types of retirement savings
systems. Defined benefit plan regulations are concerned
primarily with outputs—payments to retirees—which fall
exclusively on the employer sponsor; thus, employers sponsoring
68
defined benefit plans are more heavily regulated under ERISA.
The defined benefit system placed complete control over
retirement income with employer sponsors and therefore ERISA

63. See WOOTEN, supra note 38, at 278–79.
64. Gelter, supra note 20, at 936 (“The transformation of the American pension
system came about not through deliberate planning, but largely as an unintended
consequence of regulation that was primarily intended to protect workers.”). “ERISA
imposed minimum standards for participation, vesting, and funding that were
particularly stiff for defined benefit plans.” MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 26.
65. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 27.
66. Gelter, supra note 20, at 929–30.
67. “These often opaque rules limit (and frequently eliminate) any employer
flexibility in the financing of defined benefit plans.” Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 475.
Funding minimums, vesting requirements and contributions to the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) are discussed in this Part and fiduciary standards are
discussed separately in Part V.
68. KOZAK, supra note 4, at 86 (“Current defined benefit plans generally are funded
exclusively with employer contributions . . . .”).
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coupled that responsibility with additional regulatory oversight.69
Additionally, nearly annual legislative amendments, agency
regulations, and advisory opinions increased the costs of
implementing and complying with regulations of defined benefit
plans.70 Defined contribution plan regulations, on the other hand,
focus on inputs since the benefit that is paid is comprised entirely
of the accumulation of contributions and returns on investment,
minus administrative costs.71 Additionally, participants in
defined contribution plans bear most of the costs and the risks of
the investments whereas employer sponsors bear the costs and
the risks with defined benefit plans.72
Minimum funding requirements for defined benefit plans
serve the fundamental function of ERISA—to ensure delivery of
73
promised benefits. Employers typically fund defined benefit
plans by annual contributions based upon the number of
employees, the amount of benefits to be paid, and the age of
participants.74 Fiduciaries typically invest those pension funds in
annuities, stocks, mutual funds, bonds, or some combination
thereof.75 Funding defined benefit plans is a complex endeavor
and subject to many factors outside of the employer sponsor’s
76
control, such as large market losses. As a result, employer
sponsors are annually required to hire a private sector Enrolled
Actuary77 who recommends the annual required contribution
69. Id. at 35–37, 79–80.
70. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 26 (discussing the frequent legislative
developments and new defined benefit regulations that result in a complex and costly
regulatory environment); see also KOZAK, supra note 4, at 35–37 (discussing the numerous
amendments that have been made to ERISA since enactment).
71. KOZAK, supra note 4, at 86 (“The defined contribution model deals exclusively
with inputs . . . .”).
72. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 26 (discussing the frequent legislative
developments and new defined benefit regulations that result in a complex and costly
regulatory environment); see infra Part IV; see also KOZAK, supra note 4, at 80 (discussing
the shift of investment risk in defined contribution versus defined benefit plans).
73. Some defined contribution plans, like money purchase plans and target benefit
plans, are subject to minimum funding rules under ERISA because the employer promises
to contribute a fixed percentage of compensation. Borzi, supra note 4, at A-17.
74. See, e.g., Pension Funding Guidelines, GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
BD., www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1209PensionGuidelines.pdf (last visited
Sept. 20, 2013); see also KOZAK, supra note 4, at 113–14 (discussing the information
actuaries take into consideration in determining whether a plan is properly funded).
75. See Private Pension Plan Bulletin: Abstract of 2010 Form 5500 Annual Reports,
supra note 11, at 29, 31 (listing the distribution of assets in defined benefit plans).
76. See KOZAK, supra note 4, at 112.
77. 29 U.S.C. § 1023(a)(4)(A) (2006). “An Enrolled Actuary is any individual who
has satisfied the standards and qualifications as set forth in the regulations of the Joint
Board for the Enrollment of Actuaries as amended, and who has been approved by the
Joint Board to perform actuarial services required under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).” Enrolled Actuary Information, IRS,
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based upon the current value of the plan assets and future
liabilities in relation to current market trends.78 Inaccurate
funding estimates that result in insufficiently funded plans
require immediate deposits to cover all liability, and overfunded
plans yield steep penalty taxes on the excess funds.79
Employers’ annual contribution requirements depend in part
on market performance. For example, in a rising market the
anticipated annual contribution may be offset by returns, or in a
80
falling market, losses may increase the estimated contribution. As
a result, employers have difficulty accurately planning for annual
contribution needs. The volatility of the recommended annual
contribution affects an employer’s bottom line as well as financial
statements and reports to investors.81 Consider, for example, the
dramatic decline of the stock market in 2008, which resulted in
additional contribution burdens and decreased profits for many
employer sponsors. Defined contribution plans do not contain
similar funding requirements or penalties since the employer only
facilitates employees’ contributions.82 Under self-directed defined
contribution plans, the employee bears the risk of market loss
because only the employee is responsible for ensuring that the
83
retirement account is adequately funded, not the employer. By
shifting these risks onto employee participants in defined
contribution plans, employers avoid the uncertainty of funding
obligations and related balance-sheet adjustments.
84
Required contributions to the PBGC are another unique
85
burden imposed on nearly all defined benefit plans. The PBGC
http://www.irs.gov/Tax-Professionals/Enrolled-Actuaries/Enrolled-Actuary-Information
(last updated Apr. 15, 2013).
78. KOZAK, supra note 4, at 112–13. Enrolled Actuary assumptions include:
mortality of the participants, interest and fund earnings, disability rates of participants,
withdrawal rates of participants, future employment rates, increasing age of retirement,
benefit payment options, dependent or marital status of participants, salary scale and the
likelihood of disastrous or cyclical events affecting the employer’s industry. Id. at 113–14.
79. Id. at 112 (discussing funding inadequacy penalties and tax rates for excessive
funding of defined benefit plans).
80. See id. at 86 (noting that with defined benefit plans, “the risk of large
investment losses remains with the employer, since lower-than-expected returns or losses
will simply mean that the employer will need to make larger contributions”).
81. Id. (“Because of the required actuarial valuation, the funding requirements are
sometimes quite volatile from year to year, which not only impacts the actual contribution
required by the employer, but also can impact the business financial statements.”).
82. Id. at 109, 111 (discussing the funding requirements for employer sponsors with
defined contribution plans).
83. For a complete discussion of market performance risks, see Part IV.A.
84. KOZAK, supra note 4, at 426. “Under Title IV [of ERISA], certain employers and
plan administrators must fund an insurance system to protect certain kinds of retirement
benefits, with premiums paid to the federal government’s [PBGC].” Id.
85. Getler, supra note 20, at 930.
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bears the risk of a loss of plan assets and employer sponsor
assets.86 “Insofar as the participant’s pension claim is insured by
the PBGC, the participant . . . has recourse to the PBGC if the
employer-issuer becomes insolvent and the collateral (i.e., the
pension trust assets) becomes inadequate.”87 In the defined
benefit framework, ERISA imposes obligations on employer
sponsors to both ensure adequate fund planning through the
minimum requirements as well as to the payment of insurance
premiums to the PBGC to ensure employee recourse in the event
88
of a plan default. There are no similar requirements with
defined contribution plans and notably no such protections for
inadequate retirement account funding by individuals since the
burden to adequately fund retirement savings falls exclusively on
the employee.89
Shifting the funding responsibility to employees under
defined contribution plans and eliminating the PBGC safety net
removed many of the regulatory burdens imposed on defined
90
benefit plans. The different regulatory burdens between
defined benefit and defined contribution plans facilitated the
decline in pension plans and the rise of 401(k)s, creating the
first development crucial in establishing the defined
contribution society.91
2. Birth of the Self-Directed Plan—The IRA. The second
step in establishing the defined contribution society was the
introduction of self-directed accounts. ERISA attempted to
address, among other issues, restrictions on and complications

86. Zelinksy, supra note 5, at 465–66. The PBGC was created:
(1) to encourage the continuation and maintenance of voluntary private pension
plans for the benefit of their participants, (2) to provide for the timely and
uninterrupted payment of pension benefits to participants and beneficiaries under
plans to which this subchapter applies, and (3) to maintain premiums established by
the corporation under section 1306 of this title at the lowest level consistent with
carrying out its obligations under this subchapter.
29 U.S.C. § 1302 (2006).
87. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 466.
88. KOZAK, supra note 4, at 426. “[L]egal rules that promote security and clarity may
render benefit promises more costly; in other words, rules may have both desirable and
undesirable consequences . . . .” Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88
WASH. U. L. REV. 433, 435 (2010).
89. See, e.g., Steven Wilhelm, Why Boeing’s Fighting to Retire Union, PUGET SOUND
BUS. J. 1–2 (Jan. 11, 2013, 10:43 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/news/2013/01/
10/boeing-union-showdown-looms-on.html?page=all (describing the labor dispute between
Boeing and its engineers over the proposal elimination of defined benefit for a 401(k) plan in
light of rising and uncertain retirement costs imposed upon Boeing).
90. See supra Part II.A–B.1.
91. See supra Part II.A–B.1.
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92
of workers’ mobility. Defined benefit plans, such as pensions,
often had long vesting requirements where an employee would
not receive benefits until after she had worked a significant
93
number of years for the company, which stifled job mobility.
Additionally, the payment structure for vested benefits after
termination of employment created undesirable burdens on
94
95
employers and tax consequences for employees. “Congress
created the first, or traditional, IRA to have two roles: (1) to give
workers without retirement plan coverage at work a taxadvantaged means to save for retirement, and (2) to preserve
employer-sponsored plan assets by allowing them to be rolled
over into IRAs at job change or retirement.”96 Originally
authorized by ERISA in 1974, contributions to IRAs were tax
deductible for those workers who were not covered by an
employer-sponsored plan. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981 expanded the applicability of IRAs by allowing all
individuals, whether or not covered by an employer’s plan, to

92. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 40–44 (describing the negative effects of job
shifting on retirement income in traditional defined benefit plans).
93. See id. at 40 (comparing the retirement fund benefits associated with remaining
at one job for long periods of time versus changing jobs).
94.
Zelinksy, supra note 5, at 458, 461–67 (explaining the taxes and potential
risks employers associated with defined benefit plans).
[Drafters of ERISA] addressed the situation of the vested but younger
participant who leaves employment prior to his retirement age. Under preERISA practice, it was common . . . for the (now-terminated) employee to
receive nothing at the time he severed employment. Rather, he remained
entitled to a deferred benefit, payable on a delayed basis . . . . For both
administrative and economic reasons, this delay was often problematic,
particularly as to relatively young employees. As an administrative matter,
the plan and the terminated participant had to stay in touch with one
another for the participant to receive information about the plan and his
benefit and, ultimately, for the participant to get paid. Such participant
tracking could be (and still is) resource consuming.
Id. at 472.
95.
Id. at 473 (“While this early taxation often occurred at relatively favorable
rates such early taxation was (often correctly) viewed as diminishing the ultimate
resources available for the participant’s retirement.”).
96.
Sarah Holden et al., The Individual Retirement Account at Age 30: A
Retrospective, 11 P ERSPECTIVE 1, 4 (2005), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/per1101.pdf.
IRAs were designed with two goals when they were created in 1974 under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). First, they provide
individuals not covered by workplace retirement plans with an opportunity
to save for retirement on a tax-advantaged basis on their own. Second, they
allow workers who are leaving jobs a means to preserve the tax benefits and
growth opportunities that employer-sponsored retirement plans provide.
INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 125.
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make tax deductible contributions to their accounts.97
With an IRA, employees could transfer a pre-retirement
distribution from a qualified plan through a “rollover” to an
98
IRA. Money rolled over in the IRA account grew tax-free until
the time of withdrawal, which usually occurs at retirement.99
Rollover rules were expanded so that monies could be transferred
from one qualified employer plan to another qualified employer
plan (consolidated rollover).100 For example, if a young associate
leaves law firm X, she may roll over her benefits to a qualified
defined contribution plan of law firm Y, or to an IRA where it
could grow tax-free until retirement. The rollover feature even
facilitated converting some monies that began as defined benefit
pension investments into monies invested in an individual IRA or
another employer’s qualified defined contribution plan.101 Both
102
and the
the increasing mobility of American workers
consequences of such mobility (converting defined benefit monies
into defined contribution or IRA monies) contributed to the rise
103
of self-directed plans. “Traditional IRAs—defined as those IRAs
first allowed under ERISA—were the most common type of IRA,
owned by 39 million U.S. households [as of mid-2012],” fueled
104
primarily by rollovers. The IRA was not just a solution for
mobile employees; it became an important tax-deferred savings
vehicle for individuals investing in and outside of employer-

97. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, at 197–98 (Comm. Print
1981), available at https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=2397
(detailing the purposes, reasoning, and changes of the Economic Recovery Tax Act); Kelly
Phillips Erb, Deduct This: History of the IRA Deduction, FORBES (June 27, 2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2011/06/27/deduct-this-history-of-the-iradeduction/ (describing the history and evolution of the IRA); The Evolving Role of IRAs in
U.S. Retirement Planning, ICI RES. PERSP. 1, 3, 5 (Nov. 2009), available at
http://www.ici.org/pdf/per15-03.pdf (describing the creation of IRAs in 1974 with ERISA
and later developments with the Economic Recovery Tax Act).
98. Zelinksy, supra note 5, at 473–74.
99. Id. at 474.
100. Rollover IRAs, PERSHING 1–2 (2011), available at http://www.pershing.com/
factsheets/rollover_ira_fact_sheet.pdf (illustrating an array of options available to
employees with IRAs, including the option to rollover funds from one employer plan to
another).
101. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 474 (“Thus, over time, pension based wealth was
destined to migrate from employer-sponsored plans to the IRAs of former employees”).
102. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 42–43 (addressing conflicting scholarly
views and studies concerning the increasing mobility of American workers).
103. Id. at 40–42 (discussing job mobility and negative consequences with respect to
defined benefit plans and compatibility with defined contribution plans).
104. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 126–27 (showing the growing prevalence of
traditional IRAs after their creation under ERISA).
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sponsored plans.105 Congress created several different variations
of the IRA—the Roth IRA, the Health Savings Account, and the
Education IRA—to encourage individual savings.106
The tax incentives proved attractive to Americans and
participation in these plans grew. IRAs familiarized many
investors with the model of private securities investments for
long-term savings goals and built examples of success, which
created both acceptance of and appetite for self-directed
retirement accounts.107 In 2012, IRA assets totaled $5.4 trillion
and accounted for 28% of all retirement assets in the United
States.108 The largest component of IRAs are mutual fund assets,
totaling $2.5 trillion in 2012, followed closely by individual
brokerage accounts with $2.1 trillion in assets.109 IRAs are not
defined contribution plans, but they introduced American
workers to self-directed accounts and dependence upon
indirect ownership through mutual funds for long-term
savings goals.110 In establishing a successful model of self-

105. Zelinksy, supra note 5, at 474 (“Roth IRAs, first made available in 1998 under
the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, were owned by almost 19 million U.S. households in mid2011. Nearly 9 million U.S. households owned employer-sponsored IRAs (SEP IRAs, SARSEP IRAs, or SIMPLE IRAs).”). As of May 2012, these numbers have increased slightly,
with 20.3 million U.S. households owning Roth IRAs and 9.2 million households owning
employer-sponsored IRAs. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 126.
Congress created the Simplified Employee Pension (SEP) IRA in the Revenue
Act of 1978 because of concern [regulations were] preventing small employers
from offering retirement plans to their workers. . . . More recently, in the Small
Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Congress created the Savings Incentive
Match Plan for Employees, or SIMPLE, IRA, specifically for employers with 100
or fewer employees.
Holden et al., supra note 96, at 8 (detailing various versions of the IRA created to spread
the benefits to all employees).
106. I.R.C. §§ 408–408A, 529–530 (2006); see also Medill, supra note 33, at 327–28. ROTH
IRAs were established in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. “Contributions to Roth IRAs are not
deductible from current income, but investment earnings may generally be withdrawn tax free
(features that Congress felt might be appealing to some taxpayers). In addition, the Roth IRA
does not have a minimum distribution requirement and contributions are allowed after age
70½.” Holden et al., supra note 96, at 9 (discussing the creation of the Roth IRA and the
advantages it created under the Taxpayer Relief Act).
107. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 474–75 (acknowledging that successful experiences with
IRAs led to their increased utilization in America); see also Gelter, supra note 20, at 16–18.
108. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 125 (analyzing the evolution of IRA use after its
creation).
109. Id.
IRA owners are more likely to hold mutual funds, especially long-term mutual funds,
in their IRA portfolios than any other type of investment. Sixty-eight percent of IRAowning households had IRA assets invested in mutual funds. About four out of five of
these households, or 54 percent of all IRA-owning households, held at least a portion
of their balance in equity mutual funds.
Id. at 120 (citation omitted).
110. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 470–71.
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directed retirement accounts, IRAs were an important
benchmark in the evolution of defined contribution plans and
widespread acceptance of self-directed retirement accounts.111
Additionally, IRAs marked the beginning of dependence of
American workers on private securities markets, particularly
mutual and index funds, as key investment vehicles for long112
term savings goals.
3. Reduced Employer Fiduciary Duty for Self-Directed Plans.
Perhaps the most attractive incentive for employers to create selfdirected defined contribution plans is the relationship between selfdirected accounts (when the employee chooses the investment
allocations) and the reduction of employer fiduciary duties.
Employers sponsoring defined benefit plans must comply with a list
of fiduciary duties owed to the plan and plan participants, violation
of which exposes the employer, and other designated actors, to
personal liability for plan losses.113 In contrast, employers (and
designated actors) are largely immunized, under section 404(c) of
ERISA, against liability for investment losses resulting from
participants’ choices in the self-directed accounts regardless of
whether fiduciary duties were breached.114
The consequences of reduced fiduciary duty liability are
discussed in further detail in Part V. To advance the present
111. See id. at 469–71 (noting that IRAs “played a critical role in acclimating Americans
to the notion of tax-advantaged individual accounts”).
112. Gelter, supra note 20, at 17 (noting that employers funding defined benefit
pension plans typically invest funds for the plan in securities markets, commonly in
mutual, index, and other indirect investment vehicles); Usha Rodrigues, Corporate
Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV.
1822, 1830 (2011). Pension funds are a form of institutional investor and wield significant
market power. See generally INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 11, 39, 108 (describing
pension plans as investors in the markets and describing asset holdings).
113. Capobianco & Jara, supra note 49, at *2–5.
A fiduciary may be expressly named in the plan documents or designated as
such by the board of directors of the plan’s sponsor. However, the statute does
not limit the scope of fiduciary status to those who are expressly given the
label. . . . [C]ourts [must] determine who is performing—or has the authority to
perform—the discretionary functions that give rise to fiduciary status.
Accordingly, if a person exercises or has any discretionary authority or control
over plan administration or assets, that person will likely be a de facto ERISA
fiduciary charged with the same responsibilities and subject to the same
liabilities as any expressly identified fiduciary. The ERISA’s test is factintensive and must be construed broadly in order to effectuate the ERISA’s
purposes.
Id. at *2.
114. Gelter, supra note 20, at 17. “ERISA encouraged the creation of ‘participantdirected’ DC plans because the employer or other persons designated as or deemed to be
fiduciaries are not liable for investment losses that result from the beneficiaries’ choices.”
Id.
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argument, it is sufficient to note that the difference in the
liability structure between defined benefit and contribution plans
created another incentive for employers to offer defined
contribution plans as opposed to defined benefit plans and to
make those plans self-directed.115 These incentives contributed to
the growth of the defined contribution society we have today.
4. Additional
Regulatory
Incentives
for
Defined
Contribution Plans. In addition to the fundamental regulatory
differences between defined benefit and defined contribution
plans, ERISA creates several additional incentives for employers
to offer or convert pension plans to the defined contribution
model. Overfunded defined benefit plans, where employers
continued making aggressive contributions to the plan even in
strong market years, became a source of cash for the corporation
or a potential acquirer. Terminating a defined benefit plan and
recasting it as a defined contribution plan allows employer
sponsors to recapture the overinvested assets dedicated to the
116
pension plan. The potential cash assets in overfunded pension
plans made the employer sponsors potential targets for hostile
takeovers.117 Compare this with defined contribution plans, which
118
can be a useful corporate deterrent against hostile take-overs.
Defined contribution plan rules allow employers to offer their
own stock to employee participants as a part of an ESOP,119 and
115. Id. at 19.
Firms used the opportunity to terminate DB plans and create DC plans instead,
while taking the excess value of the plan assets (over the net present value of
the pension payments) into corporate profits. Legally, plan terminations were
made possible by a 1983 ruling by the IRS (encouraged by the Department of
Labor), which clarified that plan terminations were not only permissible in
narrow cases of ‘business necessity,’ but generally as long as the employer
bought an annuity for the existing benefits from an insurance company.
Id.
116. Id.; see MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 27. IRS code amendments in the late
1980s tried to “protect plans from terminations by imposing a reversion tax. However, the longterm effect was to make DB plans even more unattractive to employers, who reacted by
reducing the target funding ratios and ultimately by converting DB plans into cash balance
plans, which allowed them to avoid the tax penalty.” Gelter, supra note 20, at 20.
117.
MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 27 (recognizing that overfunded
pension plans created a balance sheet asset that made companies takeover targets,
especially after the plan termination rules allowed it).
118.
Gelter, supra note 20, at 31 n.189, 35 (tracing the changing environment
towards hostile takeovers and their effect on the growth of defined contribution
plans).
119.
José Martin Jara, What Is the Correct Standard of Prudence in Employer
Stock Cases?, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 541, 548 (2012). “To qualify as an ESOP, the
plan must be ‘designed to invest primarily in employer stock.’” Id.
[Defined contribution plans] would supplant defined-benefit pension plans
as the primary source of employee retirement income. Hence Congress did
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that stock can be voted with management to fend off a hostile
takeover.120 Where defined benefit plans made an employer
sponsor a hostile takeover target, defined contribution plans
could be a shield against such takeovers. Finally, employers
are better able to shift administrative costs of employee
participants under defined contribution rather than defined
benefit plans creating additional incentives with the defined
contribution, rather than the defined benefit, model.121
The difference in the regulatory framework between
defined benefit and defined contribution plans provided
incentives for employers to offer defined contribution plans
122
over defined benefit plans. The result is best described by
Professor Zelinsky as
a quiet, largely unheralded revolution, a revolution it
has been, incrementally but fundamentally changing
the manner in which Americans think about tax and
social policy and in which their governments formulate
such policy. Like any other paradigm shift, the
emergence of the defined contribution society has
123
both opened opportunities and foreclosed possibilities.
The incentives to convert defined benefit plans into
defined contribution plans along with the development of IRAs
gave rise to the second trend—the evolution of defined
contribution plans and the acceptance of self-directed defined
contribution plans where employees bore market risks and
124
Additionally,
employers enjoyed reduced fiduciary duties.
with the rise of self-directed defined contribution plans came
the corresponding dependence of participants on private
securities markets, particularly in the form of mutual and
index funds.125

not extend the 10 percent limit on employer stock holdings to 401(k) plans.
Employers thus have much latitude in determining how much employer
stock employees may hold in their 401(k).
James J. Choi, David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, Are Empowerment and
Education Enough? Underdiversification in 401(k) Plans, BROOKINGS P APERS ON
ECON. ACTIVITY , 2005, No. 2, at 151, 155.
120. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (2008) (discussing the responsibilities of
fiduciaries, especially within the proxy voting role).
121. See infra Part V.
122. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 475–77.
123. Id. at 454 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 474–77.
125. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 128; Rodrigues, supra note 112, at 1830.
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III. CITIZEN SHAREHOLDERS AND THE ALIENATION FROM
CORPORATE LAW
The emerging defined contribution society created a unique
class of investors—the citizen shareholder who predominantly
126
invests in mutual or index funds. These investors, however, do
not fit neatly within the traditional corporate law framework,
which balances shareholder accountability with management
127
authority. Nor do the reporting and disclosure requirements
under securities regulations reach citizen shareholders in a
meaningful way.128 As discussed above in Part III, ERISA’s
original purpose of securing defined benefit plans created a
system of reduced fiduciary standards and regulatory oversight
for defined contribution plans.129 Many of the intended
protections of traditional corporate law, securities regulations,
and the original ERISA framework do not fully extend to citizen
shareholders invested through defined contribution plans.130 The
following Part briefly outlines the unique attributes of defined
contribution investors and summarizes the resulting
incompatibilities with corporate and securities law, which are
131
discussed in more detail in a separate article.
The rise of the defined contribution society and the
dependence on self-directed investment accounts resulted in an
increasing number of Americans invested in the stock market as
132
their primary form of retirement savings. While there are
individual differences among many investors (i.e., priority, time
horizon, risk tolerance, level of diversification), citizen
126. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1308.
127. Id. at 1310, 1324–25.
128. The 1933 Securities Act focuses on issuance of securities from the issuing
company and sold directly to shareholders. See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Mutual Funds,
Pension Funds, Hedge Funds and Stock Market Volatility—What Regulation by the
Securities and Exchange Commission is Appropriate?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 912
935–39 (2005) (explaining the events that led to the creation of the various securities laws
and the Securities Exchange Commission). These sales and their required disclosure and
registration requirements are outside of the typical investment vehicle utilized by citizen
shareholders. Rodrigues, supra note 112, at 1828–29. The 1934 Securities Act focuses
primarily on the secondary market and the related required disclosures, as well as proxy
access. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 526, 532
(1990). The disclosures and the proxy access rights are exercised by direct shareholders, not
indirect shareholders. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1300–02, 1321. The observations stated in this
Part regarding the limited applicability these direct shareholder mechanisms have on indirect
owners are consistent with the limitations of corporate governance mechanisms described
herein.
129. See supra Part II.
130. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1309, 1316, 1324.
131. Tucker, supra note 34.
132. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 94.
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shareholders have commonalities in how they enter the
market,133 their investment in indirect funds, and a rational
preference for long-term growth to fund future retirement.134 That
citizen shareholders are indirect shareholders is a consequence of
the relationship between the rise of self-directed defined
contribution accounts and the resulting dependence upon mutual
and index funds as a primary investment vehicle for these plans.
Indirect shareholders have a complicated status in
corporate law. They have indirect voting and information
rights meaning that they get information and voting rights
only through the fund in which they are invested, not in the
135
operating companies in which the fund is invested. Indirect
shareholders own stock in a mutual or index fund; the mutual
or index fund in turn invests in hundreds of operating
companies including, for example, Coca-Cola. The mutual
fund, as the direct shareholder, votes in annual director
elections as well as various proxy proposals and end-ofcompany life decisions, such as whether or not to approve a
merger.136 Direct shareholders also receive annual operating
company information before voting and, when dissatisfied with
the company performance or policy, can exit by selling shares
on the market and investing in a suitable alternative.137
Indirect owners, however, have diluted rights as compared to
the direct shareholder. Indirect stock ownership distorts
traditional rights held by direct shareholders such as voting,
disclosure, and exit rights in operating companies. Indirect
investors receive information about the intermediary mutual
fund and vote in fund elections but do not receive information or
voting rights from Coca-Cola or the other operating companies in
133. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1313–14 (describing how employer-sponsored defined
contribution plans are a common entry point for investors into the securities markets with 72%
of first-time mutual fund purchases after 2005 occurring within defined contribution plans).
134. Id. at 1317–21 (describing citizen shareholders’ rational preference for market
performance rather than company-specific performance given their diversification and
long-term savings goals); see also Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing
Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 583–85 (2006) (discussing the role of market
performance with diversified portfolios and the concept of the universal investor); cf.
LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 8–9, 69–70 (2012) (discussing shareholder
heterogeneity).
135. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1322–24.
136. See Exchange Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988) (requiring mutual funds to follow
guidelines when “giving a proxy, consent, or authorization in respect of any security”);
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1–240.14b-2 (1990); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1990) (enumerating the
rules under which proxy agreements must be undertaken); see also MARK SARGENT &
DENNIS HONABACH, PROXY RULES HANDBOOK, § 2:12 (2011) (describing proxy voting
rules); Black, supra note 128, at 536–41 (describing shareholder notice and voting rules).
137. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1310, 1323–24.
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which the fund is invested.138 “[T]he corporation’s vote holder is not
the ultimate beneficial owner of the corporation, but instead an
intermediary that enables the investor to own an interest in a mix
139
of shares packaged as a unitary investment vehicle.”
Regarding disclosures that reach indirect investors through
intermediaries, research suggests that inundation of disclosures
decreases the effectiveness of disclosed information because of
140
Additionally, the rational apathy of
competing noise.
shareholders, particularly indirect owners, makes corporate reforms
to increase shareholder accountability like say-on-pay symbolic, but
ineffective, tools to give indirect shareholders meaningful
141
participation rights in corporate governance.
The diluted
information rights of indirect owners also affect exit rights—where
the choice to leave is prompted by timely and accurate information,
which indirect owners do not receive. Additionally, indirect owners
cannot sell just their indirect interest in one operating company, but
they must sell their interest in the entire fund.142
Indirect shareholders are distanced from many powerbalancing mechanisms in corporate law and securities disclosures
intended to protect shareholder interests. Instead, they must rely
on the intermediary, like a mutual fund, to adequately represent
and protect their interests.143 Intermediaries, often in the form of
138. See, e.g., Black, supra note 128, at 523–24, 536–37 (describing direct
shareholder notice and voting rules); Taub, supra note 32, at 851 (“[Mutual fund
participants] take[] the economic risk, but [they are] not the legal owner of the mutual
fund or the underlying portfolio companies. In this way, [the investors are] distanced even
more from the location of control over the capital [they have] at risk.”); see also Tucker,
supra note 15, 1323–24, 1327–28 (comparing direct and indirect shareholders’ voting and
information rights).
139. Rodrigues, supra note 112, at 1828–29.
140. Id. at 1853–55 (describing disclosures as failures because additional disclosures
are “noisy” and “easy for investors to ignore” and offer little by the way of tangible result).
141. See Black, supra note 128, at 523–24 (discussing indirect shareholder passivity).
142. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1328.
143. See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents
and Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1409 (2006) (arguing
that the mutual fund “industry’s faults can be found in the idiosyncratic structure of
mutual funds, a structure that exacerbates the ability of managers to wield substantial
power and to use that power to extract rents both overtly and surreptitiously from
shareholders”); Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of
Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 322–23
(2011) (describing the power of mutual fund managers due to the size of votes they
represent).
Interestingly, mutual funds . . . have been described as ‘relatively docile
shareholders’ because they rarely engage in activism. . . . Some observers have
criticized possible conflicts of interest of mutual fund managers. Arguably
they are sometimes inclined to please corporate managers, who are in the
position to direct employees’ 401(k) wealth to investment companies that do
not object to the firm’s corporate governance practices. There is some evidence
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mutual funds and other institutional shareholders, represent
citizen shareholders and other indirect owners. A history of mutual
funds’ preference for passivity over shareholder activism and
consistent support of management proposals are two reasons why
the representative capacity of mutual funds is called into question
as having misaligned interests with those of its investors.144 The free
rider problem also discourages mutual funds from bearing costs of
shareholder activism when they cannot secure the sole benefit for
those efforts.145 Similarly, the hope that other institutional
shareholders may incur the costs and take a leadership role is also a
powerful disincentive to activism.146

Indirect
Investors

Citizen
Shareholders

Defined
Contribution
Investors

that business ties make mutual funds vote in a more manager-friendly way,
but it is not unambiguous.
Gelter, supra note 20, at 38.
144.
James Cotter, Alan Palmiter & Randall Thomas, ISS Recommendations and
Mutual Fund Voting on Proxy Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1, 7, 46 (2010) (finding that
mutual funds delegate voting decisions to professional proxy services and
“consistently” side with management); Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the
Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 295 (2012)
(describing problems of short-term and long-term time horizon conflicts); Alan R.
Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Not Disclose?, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV . 1419, 1430–31 (2002) (summarizing academic studies concluding that mutual
funds are passive investors); Rodrigues, supra note 112, at 1830–31 (“[Mutual funds
hold] stock in myriad companies and therefore lack the incentive to expend research
costs in determining which votes in which particular companies would most increase
value. In addition, investments in mutual funds are highly liquid, meaning that a
mutual fund investor discontented with a fund’s performance can withdraw her
money at any time.”); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Equilibrium Short
Horizons of Investors and Firms, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 148, 149 (1990) (finding the
benefits of long- and short-term arbitrage while also disclosing the risk associated
with them). For a comprehensive discussion on noise trading, see Fischer Black,
Noise, 41 J. F IN. 529, 529–41 (1986) (evaluating both the adverse and beneficial
aspects of trading on noise).
145.
Roberta Romano, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance in
the US, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE US AND EUROPE: W HERE ARE WE NOW? 55
(Geoffrey Owen et al. eds., 2006) (shedding light on restrictions to shareholder
activism); see also Dallas, supra note 144, at 270 (discussing the problems managers
face when confronted by a lack of information).
146.
Fisch, supra note 27, at 881–84 (observing the consequences of “slicing and
dicing” corporate ownership interests).
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Under my definition, citizen shareholders are likely to be
147
indirect, rather than direct, shareholders. The limitations of
indirect shareholder status are further exacerbated with citizen
shareholders because they have reduced choice in whether or not to
148
invest. Tax incentives, opt-in rules that promote participation in
401(k)s, and the lack of other viable retirement savings alternatives
tip the scales in favor of investment and reduce an individual’s
“choice” as to participation. Second, the menu options of
investments within plans—often mutual or index funds along with
money market, bonds, or company stock149—alter investment choice
for citizen shareholders as well. Within the universe of restricted
choice, citizen shareholders invest heavily in mutual or index funds,
which fuel the growth of indirect shareholders.150 Limited choice
between investment options in the defined contribution menus
restrict citizen shareholders’ ability to exit.151 In the contained
147.
Tucker, supra note 15, at 1302. “The spread of 401(k) plans contributed to
the enormous expansion of the mutual funds industry, where much of these savings
are invested.” Gelter, supra note 20, at 38.
Mutual fund ownership has become so widespread largely because mutual
funds are a primary way that Americans save for retirement. Definedcontribution retirement plans and Individual Retirement Accounts often
hold mutual funds, and the rapid growth of these plans and accounts has
increased mutual funds’ total share of retirement assets. Mutual funds now
hold approximately a quarter of America’s retirement savings.
Molly Mercer, Alan R. Palmiter & Ahmed E. Taha, Worthless Warnings? Testing the
Effectiveness of Disclaimers in Mutual Fund Advertisements, 7 J. EMPIRICAL L EGAL
STUD. 429, 432 (2010) (arguing that mutual funds are the most predominate vehicles
for saving for retirement).
148.
See Medill, supra note 33, at 333 (discussing the role of automatic
enrollment and other incentives to participate in defined contribution plans); Cass R.
Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV . 1349, 1393 (2011)
(describing the consequences of automatic enrollment defaults with defined
contribution plans and how they increased participation by altering participants’
choice).
149.
See, e.g., INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 117–18 (describing defined
contribution asset allocations in equities, funds, company stock, bonds and money
market accounts).
150. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1322–23 & n.111. An index mutual fund is “[a] fund
designed to track the performance of a market index. The fund’s portfolio of securities is either
a replicate or a representative sample of the designated market index. Often referred to as
passively managed portfolios.” INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 226. A mutual fund is
[a]n investment company registered with the SEC that buys a portfolio of securities
selected by a professional investment adviser to meet a specified financial goal
(investment objective). Mutual funds can have actively managed portfolios, where a
professional investment adviser creates a unique mix of investments to meet a
particular investment objective, or passively managed portfolios, in which the adviser
seeks to track the performance of a selected benchmark or index.
Id. at 228.
151. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1327.
While others have argued that the fungible nature of mutual funds makes it an
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universe of a 401(k) plan offering a limited array of investment
options, the indirect owner must find an alternative fund that
does not invest in Coca-Cola and offers a similar risk and
diversification portfolio.152 Exit rights are also constrained for
citizen shareholders because of the likely absence of a suitable
alternative investment within the plan.153
Additionally, the question of aligned interests between
mutual fund managers and investors is exacerbated by citizen
shareholder status. Citizen shareholders who are saving for
retirement have a presumed long-term investment horizon and
want to achieve sustained growth over a period of time.154 This
long-term time horizon may be in conflict with investment
horizons of mutual fund managers where the models of
performance evaluation and compensation drive short-term
155
time horizons at the funds.
The nature of defined
contribution plan structures further complicates the question
of aligning interests. Employer sponsors of defined
contribution plans are often seen as the “client” of the mutual
even more liquid asset than investment in an individual company and therefore
contains strengthened exit rights, this view does not take into account the
realities of how a majority of investors enter and remain in the market.
Id.; see John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and
Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 88, 102–05 (discussing
enhanced exit rights of mutual fund investors who withdraw cash from the fund’s assets
whereas the sale of direct stock does not affect the assets of the company); see also Strine,
supra note 15, at 11 (“[S]cholars would say that the ability of mutual fund investors to get
their money out at net asset value whenever they want gives them a protection that the
stockholders of operating companies do not have. But that retort seems hollow. The net
asset value of my mutual fund simply reflects the market value of its investments, most of
which are in the stock of publicly traded operating corporations.”).
152. See Tucker, supra note 15, at 1329 n.142 (describing investment risk and
diversification options within a given defined contribution plan).
153. “[T]he idea that investors have more real choice in mutual fund investments
than they have in operating company investments is hardly self-evident.” Strine, supra
note 15, at 7.
154. See Rodrigues, supra note 112, at 1830 (“Actively managed mutual funds
attempt to beat the market by investing in stocks that appreciate faster than average.”).
But see Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 144, at 149 (arguing that making multiple short
term arbitrage trades can actually be less risky and lead to more growth than long term
trades). In one study, two authors sought to establish the harm of real earnings
management relative to accrual earning management by studying the cost of capital.
Jeong-Bon Kim & Byungcherl Charlie Sohn, Real Earnings Management and Cost of
Capital, 32 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2013). Their study concluded that real
earnings management distorts the role of earnings as an indicator of a firm’s true future
cash flows and thus exacerbates information problems faced by outside investors to a
greater extent than does accrual earnings management. Id. (manuscript at 2, 21–22).
155. Taub, supra note 32, at 867–72 (2009) (describing in detail conflicts of interests
between managers and indirect owners); see also Dallas, supra note 144, at 272–73
(describing managers’ tactics to increase compensation, bonuses, and performance
evaluations based upon short-term performance which may create detrimental long-term
effects within the fund and the invested-in companies).
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fund and their interests are served over the interests of
individual citizen shareholders.156
A growing group of Americans are encouraged through tax
incentives and automatic enrollment programs to invest in the stock
market through defined contribution plans for retirement savings;
but once invested, they enjoy a fraction of the investor protections
assumed to balance the playing field and help promote and protect
nest eggs.157 Citizen shareholders are not investing in an open
market but instead choosing among a limited range of investment
158
vehicles. A worker’s decision to invest diverted compensation in
one of approximately twenty mutual, index, or bond funds through
an automatic-enrollment 401(k) is materially different from an
individual investor placing discretionary savings in the market
where participation, investment choice and exit are not
constrained.159 The problems of indirect ownership status are
intensified with citizen shareholders and raise questions regarding
the reach and applicability of corporate governance and securities
regulations intended to protect investors.160
IV. SHIFTING RISKS ONTO CITIZEN SHAREHOLDERS IN THE
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION SOCIETY
Citizen shareholders have an additional set of protections
outside of the traditional corporate governance mechanisms of
voting, information, and exit rights, and securities regulations.
Citizen shareholders, because they enter the stock market
through employer-sponsored defined contribution plans, have the
statutory rights and protections provided under ERISA, which
governs employer-provided benefits.161 This Part discusses how
conversion from defined benefit to self-directed defined
contribution plans shifts significant risks onto participants, risks
which have the potential to undermine individual and national
retirement security.
ERISA, enacted in 1974, focused primarily on defined benefit
156. “[T]he [mutual fund] industry’s true customers are not individual investors, but
rather portfolio companies that can decide how to allocate their employee-thrift business.”
Cotter, Palmiter & Thomas, supra note 144, at 9.
157. Rodrigues, supra note 112, at 1828–29, 1836, 1859–60.
158. Tucker, supra note 15, at 1328–29, 1336–40 (describing investment options
within a defined contribution plan and describing the mutual funds included in defined
contribution plans offered by the three case study companies Wal-Mart, IBM and WellPoint discussed in the article).
159. Id. at 1303–04.
160. For a further discussion of these issues, see Tucker, supra note 34.
161. See supra note 31 (discussing the protections provided under ERISA).
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pensions, the most common form of retirement benefits at that
time.162 As previously described, under defined benefit plans, the
responsibility of funding and paying retirement benefits to
163
retirees rested solely on the employer. With this responsibility
came great risk: risk of bankruptcy and underfunded pensions
that could leave retirees with inadequate retirement income and
164
could jeopardize the financial stability of the country. With
great risk came strong regulation, as discussed in Part II.165 In
order to ameliorate both the risk and the regulatory burdens
borne under defined benefit plans, employers gradually shifted
the risk of funding and administering retirement benefits onto
employees by adopting and proliferating self-directed defined
166
contribution plans. In our defined contribution society, we
are left with the question: If the purpose of ERISA is
protecting workers’ retirement benefits, is that purpose best
served by shifting risks onto the workers and reducing both
oversight and safety nets for retirement savings?
Under a self-directed defined contribution model, three
important risks are shifted to employee investors—market
167
In
performance, information risks, and longevity risks.
shifting these responsibilities to employees, these risks also
became largely unregulated.168 In contrast, under the defined
benefit model, employers bore these risks and were the subject
169
of extensive ERISA regulations. The few ERISA protections
that remain in place for self-directed defined contribution
plans are eliminated170 once an employee retires or changes
162. See Gelter, supra note 20, at 922 (“The predominant form of private pension was
the defined benefit (DB) plan, under which an employee receives a pension of a specified
amount upon retirement.”).
163. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (describing defined benefit plans).
164. See supra note 49.
165. Supra Part II.
166. See Gelter, supra note 20, at 923 (discussing the change from defined benefit to
defined contribution plans).
167. See infra Part IV.A–C (describing each risk in detail).
168. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 9 (“The defining characteristic of 401(k)
plans is that they shift the risks and responsibilities associated with providing retirement
income from the employer to the employee. Shifting the risk means that employees both
enjoy the gains and suffer the losses of their investment decisions.”); Zelinsky, supra note
5, at 458 (“[D]efined contribution arrangements shift the risk of poor (and the rewards of
better) investment performance to the employee, because her entitlement under the plan
is her account balance, however low (or high) that balance might be.”).
169. See supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory burdens
and risks).
170.
[U.S.] retirees effectively have fewer regulatory protections than do most
workers. This is an unintended consequence of the nation’s system of definedcontribution retirement savings. . . . However, almost all retirees eventually roll
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jobs and moves the investment into a private account such as
an IRA.171
Regardless of the reader’s normative view of the efficacy of
the defined contribution society, it is unquestionably in place and
shapes how a majority of Americans invest in the market as well
as the financial security of both individuals and our nation. One
consequence of the retirement revolution is the shifting of
significant risks onto participants, risks that were borne by
employers and federally backed safety nets like the PBGC under
the pension paradigm. Risk should be a critical component of
debates about the role of citizen shareholders in our markets,
securities regulations, and corporate governance regimes. This
model of retirement savings poses a unique set of risks for
investors entering the market—risks that are not lessened under
the ERISA regulatory framework. The following Part describes
the limitations of the ERISA framework with regard to citizen
shareholders.
A. Market Performance Risks
In a defined contribution society, the individual financial
security of many Americans and the general financial security of
our country in future decades are inextricably intertwined with
172
the success of capital markets. The most dramatic risk shifted
from defined benefit to self-directed defined contribution plans is
that participants bear the risks of market performance.
Under the defined benefit paradigm, employers’ pension
funds were often invested heavily in securities markets, and
173
thus, employers bore the risk of market performance. In other
their accumulated balances out of ERISA-regulated accounts into Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRAs), which are regulated with a much lighter touch. For
example, the broker-dealer securities firms that manage most IRAs have no
fiduciary duty toward their customers. Thus, the system currently provides the
least regulation for precisely the age group with the greatest vulnerability.
Agarwal et al., supra note 58, at 53–54.
171. Medill, supra note 33, at 343.
In 2004, assets held in IRAs were valued at $3.48 trillion. By comparison, assets
held in all employer-sponsored defined contribution plans (primarily 401(k)
plans) were valued at $2.68 trillion in 2004. These numbers suggest that IRAs,
not employer-sponsored plans, will be the most significant source of non-Social
Security income for future retirees.
Id. (citations omitted).
172. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 68 (“[R]etirement income in 401(k) plans
depends on the success of the participant’s investment choices. Moreover, most
participants’ financial security in retirement rests on these choices because the 401(k)
often represents the bulk of the family’s financial assets.”).
173. See KOZAK, supra note 4, at 86 (“In all types of defined benefit plans . . . the risk
of large investment losses remains with the employer.”).
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words, if the market declined it was the pension fund/employer
that had to make up the difference, not the retiree. Most
employees enrolled in self-directed defined contribution plans
depend upon average market returns to build retirement savings
over a lifetime.174 As discussed above, mutual funds are a popular
investment vehicle for individual investors fueled, in part, by the
175
Defined
rise in self-directed defined contribution plans.
contribution plans also offer investment options other than
mutual funds, such as bonds, money market accounts, and
company stock, but mutual and index funds are the most
appealing option because they satisfy portfolio diversification
needs.176 Citizen shareholders bear the risks of their investments
(i.e., a negative return) without robust traditional shareholder
protections and without the benefit of an employer-provided
safety net, or the PBGC,177 as exists under defined benefit
178
plans.
B. Information Risks
Related to portfolio performance and market risks are
investment information access and asymmetry risks. Information
risks include the ability to assess the market and make investment
decisions that generate long-term returns as well as demonstrate
general financial literacy.179 In defined benefit models, employers,
designated trustees, or paid investment advisors oversee pension
174. Gelter, supra note 20, at 928 (noting that “[p]otential retirees are therefore to a
large extent dependent on the development of the stock market, and to a lesser extent, of
the bond market,” and the reason for the dominance of equity is that “it is the only type of
investment that yields profits that are high enough ‘to make retirement income programs
work’” (citation omitted)).
175. See supra note 50.
176. See Beginners’ Guide to Asset Allocation, Diversification, and Rebalancing, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/assetallocation.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
Because achieving diversification can be so challenging, some investors may find it
easier to diversify within each asset category through the ownership of mutual funds
rather than through individual investments from each asset category. A mutual fund
is a company that pools money from many investors and invests the money in stocks,
bonds, and other financial instruments. Mutual funds make it easy for investors to
own a small portion of many investments. A total stock market index fund, for
example, owns stock in thousands of companies.
Id.
177. See MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 47–49; see also supra text accompanying
notes 84–89 (discussing investment risks and the PBGC).
178. See MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 47 (“One type of financial risk is the
possibility that the real rate of return will fall below historic norms during the accumulation
phase. That is, if the stock market falls, the sponsor of a defined benefit plan must cover
promised benefits. In a 401(k) plan, the participant suffers the loss.”).
179. See Medill, supra note 33, at 329, 333 (describing investors’ need of “the motivation
and knowledge necessary to save and invest”).
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fund investment decisions.180 Under a self-directed defined
contribution model, in contrast, the individual employee allocates
investments within the options offered by the plan; thus, the
181
information risk passes to the individual. Shifting the information
risk to individual participants is problematic because of information
asymmetries, general financial illiteracy, current methods of
providing investor education, and greater likelihood of bad decisions
with insufficient information. The decisions involved in self-directed
retirement investments implicate high information costs,182 and the
consequences of poor decisions have the potential to be individually
and socially disastrous.
Citing to a 2004 study, Professor Lusardi concluded that
“workers continue to be uninformed about the rules and the benefits
associated with their [retirement benefits], despite the large
shift . . . from [defined benefit] to [defined contribution] plans, which
183
has [given] workers more [retirement savings] responsibility.” In a
comprehensive review of the efficacy of investment warnings,
Professor Palmiter surveyed existing consumer behavior and
knowledge research, concluding that:
These studies paint an unflattering portrait of the typical
mutual fund investor. They find that fund investors
generally
are
uninformed
and
financially
unsophisticated. For example, most investors are
unaware of the investment objectives, composition, fees
and expenses, and risks of their funds. Although
investors pay little attention to a fund’s objectives, risk,
and costs, they pay great attention to a fund’s historical
184
returns.
The information deficit by self-directed defined contribution
participants is not wholly unaddressed by ERISA; employers are

180. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 458 (discussing employer investment responsibility under
defined benefit plans).
181.
See KOZAK, supra note 4, at 86 (“In all types of defined contribution plans,
the risk of large investment losses . . . remains with each individual participant.”).
182.
Medill, supra note 33, at 333 (“Retirement financial planning involves high
information costs in determining and assessing available options, and then using
those options to manage various types of financial risks.” (citation omitted)); see also
id. at 334–35 (discussing high information costs of investment decisions and coping
mechanisms for participants such as the endorsement effect, framing effects, and
risk/loss aversion).
183.
Annamaria Lusardi, Household Savings Behavior in the United States: The
Role of Literacy, Information, and Financial Education Programs, in P OLICYMAKING
INSIGHTS F ROM BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 109, 121 (Christopher L. Foote et al. eds.,
2009).
184.
Mercer, Palmiter & Taha, supra note 147, at 432 (citation omitted).
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required to provide participants with account statements.185 In
addition, plan participants receive a Summary Annual Report186 and
notices regarding portfolio diversification, automatic enrollment (if
187
applicable), default investment options (if applicable), and fees.
Disclosures, while politically expedient solutions, pose problems in
application and effectiveness.188 Additional disclosures, in
conjunction with the countless other forms of notice, are considered
“noisy” and “easy for investors to ignore,” often generating
compliance costs and sources of litigation but little in way of
189
applicability to the end-user.
The information asymmetry is not just an absence of
information; it is also an absence of knowledge about how to
190
process available information. Financial illiteracy of many
191
participants
is
“particularly
acute among specific
demographic groups such as women, African-Americans,
Hispanics, and those with low levels of education.”192 There is a
significant, positive correlation between financial literacy and
193
retirement planning and performance.
Financial illiteracy
185.
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B)(1)–(2) (2006); Usha Rodrigues & Mike
Stegemoller, Placebo Ethics: A Study in Securities Disclosure Arbitrage, 96 VA . L.
REV . 1, 45 (2010) (discussing how information embedded in disclosures can be
muddled and easy to ignore because of other information included in such
disclosures).
186.
KOZAK, supra note 4, at 405.
The SAR must contain specific information: for defined contribution plans:
financial statement for employee pension benefit plans; and the number of
employees, name and address of each fiduciary, the name of and reason any
person received compensation to perform services for the plan, and a reason
for the change on any material plan advisor.
Id. at 409.
187.
Id. at 405. Recent forms focus on additional disclosures for participants. See
Fact Sheet: Final Rule to Improve Transparency of Fees and Expenses to Workers in
401(k)-Type
Retirement
Plans,
U.S.
DEP’ T
OF
LABOR
(Feb.
2012),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fsparticipantfeerule.html [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
For a more complete discussion of proposed disclosure reforms, see Part VI.B.2.
188.
Rodrigues, supra note 112, at 1824.
189.
Id. at 1853–54.
190.
See Gavin Clarkson, Wall Street Indians: Information Asymmetry and
Barriers to Tribal Capital Market Access, 12 L EWIS & CLARK L. REV. 943, 947 (2008)
(“[I]nformation asymmetry exists when a party possesses greater informational
awareness pertinent to effective participation in a given situation relative to other
participating parties.”).
191. Lusardi, supra note 183, at 109 (describing “widespread” financial illiteracy).
192. Id. (citation omitted).
193. Medill, supra note 33, at 337–38.
Numerous research studies have found that even when controlling for
disparities in income levels, there is a strong positive correlation between the
level of financial literacy and the amount of personal retirement savings. The
causal link between the two centers on the planning process. Researchers
hypothesize that greater financial literacy improves retirement savings because
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threatens the success of individual retirement savings as well as
the social safety net of retirement where our policies strive to
facilitate comfortable retirements for an aging population. A
criticism of the ERISA disclosure policies and practices is that
they are “dishonest.”194 “A policy based on the providing of
information to participants that is not provided, and on the
assumption that participants will use this information on their
own in ways that they can not, are essentially a fictitious
construct.”195
The ERISA framework is ill-equipped to address financial
literacy deficiencies with few resources dedicated to participant
education aimed at compensating for these shifting risks. Under
ERISA, employer sponsors are not required to provide financial
education or advice to participants.196 The Department of Labor
(DOL) oversees any employer/employee education initiatives
implemented.197 Employers must provide some additional
information upon request, such as fee comparisons and charges
198
that may reduce return rates.
Despite these limitations,
it counters psychological biases and improves the cognitive ability of individuals
to collect and evaluate information concerning their options. Significantly,
researchers have shown that improved financial literacy correlates with higher
levels of retirement savings by all workers, not just those with high incomes.
Id.; see also Lusardi, supra note 183, at 113–20 (discussing the correlation between
financial planning behaviors and wealth accumulation).
194. Herbert A. Whitehouse, The Use of ERISA § 3(38) Investment Managers in
Plans Offering Mutual Fund Investment Options to Participants § 1.07 (Apr. 15, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id= 1811085.
195. Id.
196. Medill, supra note 33, at 338 (“Employers are not required to provide investment
educational materials to 401(k) plan participants, and many employers do not.”); see also 29
C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(c)(4) (2006) (“A fiduciary has no obligation under part four of Title I of the
Act to provide investment advice to a participant or beneficiary under an ERISA section 404(c)
plan.”); 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B)(1)–(2) (noting that “there is no obligation to provide
investment advice at any time” under section (c)(4)); Participant Directed Individual Account
Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 49,906, 46,922 (Oct. 13, 1992) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550).
197. In the 1997 Savings Are Vital to Everyone’s Retirement (SAVER) Act, Congress
vested the Department of Labor (DOL) with the responsibility to encourage retirement
financial education. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1146–1447 (2000). Congress found that “far too many
Americans—particularly the young—are either unaware of, or without the knowledge and
resources necessary to take advantage of, the extensive benefits offered by our retirement
savings system.” Savings Are Vital to Everyone’s Retirement (SAVER) Act of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-92, § 2(a)(3), 111 Stat. 2139, 2139. To promote retirement savings through
education, the DOL was tasked with creating an ongoing public education program. 29
U.S.C. § 1146; SAVER Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-92, § 2(a)(3), 111 Stat. 2139, 2139.
198. Medill, supra note 33, at 345–46.
Employers are not absolutely required to provide participants in their 401(k)
plans with a comparative description of the investment management fees and
other charges that may reduce the rate of return for each investment option
available under the plans. Rather, an employer must provide this information
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employer education is a common source of financial
information,199 as is information from friends and families.200 The
platform of employer-provided financial education is criticized as
being ineffective or marginally effective (i.e., raising awareness
but not changing behaviors) and geared towards those likely to
already be engaged in some form of financial planning rather
201
than overcoming fundamental knowledge gaps for participants.
The consequences of these information asymmetries are
significant: without proper information participants charged
with managing their retirement accounts make poor and too
few choices. For example, many participants do not save
enough and erode accumulated savings with early withdrawals
202
or loans. Specifically, one in four American households make
pre-retirement withdrawals for nonretirement spending

only if a participant affirmatively requests the information. Furthermore,
employers are not required to explain to participants how even a slightly higher
investment management fee, compounded over time, can significantly reduce
their account balances at retirement.
Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(2)(i)(B)(1) (listing mandatory disclosure
information that employers must divulge to plan participants); id. §§ 2550.404c1(b)(2)(i)(B)(2)(i)–(ii) (describing the information the fiduciary must provide the
beneficiary).
199. Medill, supra note 33, at 338 (“The most likely source of financial education is
from an employer who sponsors a 401(k) plan.”).
200. Lusardi, supra note 183, at 134 (describing research establishing that default
contribution rates in defined contribution plans are too low and lead to insufficient
savings as well as a failure to capitalize upon employer matching programs and tax
deferral savings); see also id. at 127–28 (citing family and friends as a primary source of
financial information).
201. See Medill, supra note 33, at 338–39 (“When employers do provide such
educational materials, the quality is uneven. Recent research also suggests that
employer-provided educational materials are geared toward individuals who are natural
‘planners’ and that these materials do not appeal to the approximately 50 percent of the
working population that is not planning-oriented.”); see also Lusardi, supra note 183, at
132 (“After attending the seminar, several participants stated they intended to change
their retirement goals, and many revised their expected level of retirement
income. . . . However, it was only a minority of participants who were affected by the
seminars. Just 12 percent of seminar attendees reported changes in retirement-age goals
and close to 30 percent reported changes in retirement-income goals. Moreover, their
intentions did not always translate into actions. When interviewed several months later,
many of those who had intended to make changes had not implemented them yet.”).
202. See Lusardi, supra note 183, at 134 (discussing low savings rates and low default
contribution rates). The hidden problem with self-directed 401(k) plans is the lure to cash out
retirement savings as needed or when the participant changes jobs rather than roll it over.
MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 39. Another reason for underfunded defined contribution
accounts is the role of fees. Id. at 76 (“[A] possible explanation for the lower return in defined
contribution plans is investment fees, which typically account for 75–90 percent of total
expenses associated with managing 401(k) plans. These fees (which compensate providers of,
say, mutual funds for selecting the stocks and undertaking the research that leads to buy and
sell decisions) are usually assessed as a percentage of invested assets and are paid by the
employee through direct deductions from investment returns.”).
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needs.203 Many participants do not adjust initial investment
allocations or default allocations for a plan to account for
increased salary, age, or retirement needs.204 Participants
consistently make investment allocations based upon the past
performance of funds despite extensive empirical evidence (and
SEC disclosures) that past returns are not a guarantee or even a
205
good predictor of future, positive returns.
Additionally, if
available, participants tend to overinvest in company stock as a
part of an employee stock option plan due to familiarity,
206
endorsement, and loyalty biases.
Behavioral economics provides some explanation for these
results. In the absence of tools to make informed decisions,
participants may rely upon biases and information heuristics to
manage their retirement savings, including “procrastination
(people delay saving, do not save, or do not save enough), inertia
(people stay where they are), and immobilization (whereby
conflicts and confusion lead people to behave passively, like a
203. Stephen Miller, Preretirement 401(k) Breaches on the Rise: Household Budgets and
Emergency Funds Can Help Workers Avoid Raids on Their 401(k)s, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES.
MGMT.
(Jan.
25,
2013),
http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/benefits/Articles/Pages/
Preretirement-401k-Breaches.aspx.
204. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 91 (“[Forty-seven] percent of participants
made no changes, and another 21 percent made only one change over the nine-year
period. In terms of assets, 73 percent made no changes, and another 14 percent made only
one change.”); see also id. at 90 (documenting that people do not change investment
allocations based upon age or investment return); id. at 82–83 (describing failures to
reallocate investment based upon returns and disrupting intended plan balances, which
create an asset blend that is either too conservative or risky).
205. Mercer, Palmiter & Taha, supra note 147, at 430–35 (documenting the reliance
of individuals on past performance in making investment allocation decisions and the
evidence that dispels a relationship between past high returns and future positive
performance).
Capon, Fitzsimons, and Rice’s survey of households that invest in mutual funds
found that a fund’s ‘investment performance track record’ was the most
important factor in investors’ choice of funds. Also, a survey sponsored by the
Investment Company Institute—the trade association of the mutual fund
industry—found that 69 percent of fund investors reviewed a fund’s ‘historical
performance’ before investing.
Id. at 433 (footnotes omitted); see also Michael Finke & Shaun Pfeiffer, Performance Gap:
The Impact of Broker Advice and Fund Valuation 2, 3 (2011) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.academyfinancial.org/10Conference/10Proceedings/(5B)%20Finke,
%20Pfeiffer.pdf (describing recent research confirming that priority investors place on
past returns rather than other more predictive fund features, such as fees and costs).
206. Congress did not extend the 10% limit on employer stock holdings that exists
with defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans. Choi, Laibson & Madrian, supra
note 119, at 155. As such, employer sponsors have flexibility with regard to how much
company stock to offer in plans. Participant choices regarding company stock, however,
may be subject to biases such as loyalty (feeling like they should invest in the company),
endorsement (inclusive signals endorsement of the safety of the investment), and
familiarity (in a world of unknown investments the informed decision to select the one you
know). Id. at 157–58.
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deer in the headlights).”207 Information asymmetries and
inadequate tools to manage individual investment portfolios
demonstrate the risk shift under self-directed defined
contribution plans and may lead to insufficient savings and
exposure to great risks.
C. Longevity Risks
Another factor that influences the success of retirement
savings is the longevity risk, which asks how long retirees will
live. Increasing life expectancy increases funding obligations.208
The longevity risk assumed by defined contribution participants
is that they live longer than expected and therefore spend their
209
retirement money before they (or their spouse) die.
Depending on the payment option selected, under defined
benefit plans retirees are paid a fixed amount until their death or
the death of their spouse so that employers, not the individuals,
210
bear the risk of longevity. Defined benefit plans thus offer an
annuity-like payment system, which guarantees a constant sum
of money over the remaining life of the participant and any
designated beneficiaries.211 The longevity risk is exacerbated in
the defined contribution context because retirement benefits
are generally available as a lump sum upon reaching the
minimum age of retirement.212 Once the retirement benefit is
207. Nicholas Barr & Peter Diamond, Reforming Pensions: Lessons from Economic
Theory and Some Policy Directions, ECONOMIA, Spring 2011, at 1, 9 (2010).
208. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 458–62 (describing three types of pension benefit
risks: investment risk, funding risk, and longevity risk); see also MUNNELL & SUNDÉN,
supra note 6, at 47 (discussing longevity risks of defined contribution plans borne by
retirees and the need to purchase annuities).
209. See Don Ezra, How Should Retirees Manage Investment and Longevity Risk in a
Defined Contribution World?, ROTMAN INT’L J. PENSION MGMT., Fall 2011, at 3, 62,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1829342 (describing longevity risk of investments).
210. See Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 458, 462.
211. See id. at 462.
The traditional, annuity-paying defined benefit plan provides at least partial
protection against longevity risk because such a traditional pension disburses
retirement payments periodically (typically monthly) and continues such
annuity-type payments until the participant’s death—often with payments
continuing at a reduced level to the surviving spouse. With such a lifetime
annuity it is by definition impossible for the retiree to outlive her pension
income, though that income may decline in real value if it is not increased to
reflect increments in the cost of living.
Id.
212. At retirement, each participant is entitled to receive the balance of his or her
account. Borzi, supra note 4, at A-15. These lump-sum distributions of defined
contribution plans generate significant challenges of managing and investing that money
in light of potential stock market volatility, risks of high inflation/low interest rates, life
expectancy, and health care costs. Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus, Lessons from
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paid out, the money is beyond the purview of ERISA
oversight.213 Not only must the retiree make assumptions about
life expectancy and therefore the anticipated amount needed
for retirement, but the retiree must then either monitor
distributions from the savings or individually purchase an
annuity.214 While there are justifications for purchasing an
annuity upon withdrawing assets from a defined contribution
plan, it is neither required, nor is it a common practice.215
Annuities are expensive to purchase individually and involve a
loss of control over the invested assets that can be barriers to
consumers’ purchase.216 The longevity risks increase, of course,
with rising life expectancy and the rising cost of health care.217
Longevity risks increase the burden on citizen shareholders
and pose a threat to retirement financial security.
In our defined contribution society, individuals are tasked
with allocating and monitoring portfolios as well as
understanding basic market and longevity risks. Shifting these
burdens onto individuals pose obstacles for many—
Behavioral Finance for Retirement Plan Design, in PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE 3,
26–30 (2004). Participants age 59½ or older can withdraw from qualified retirement
accounts without incurring an early withdrawal penalty tax of 10%. Retirement Topics—
Tax on Early Distributions, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Plan-Participant,Employee/Retirement-Topics---Tax-on-Early-Distributions (last updated June 17, 2013).
213. Borzi, supra note 4, at A-14.
214. See Ezra, supra note 209, at 63 (describing an annuity as “the only way to take
longevity risk out of the picture”).
215. See Barr & Diamond, supra note 207, at 3 (“Fluctuations in the cumulative
return on assets during working life affect the individual account holder by affecting the
amount available to finance retirement. If the worker buys an annuity, he or she will have
faced the risk in the pricing of annuities, reflecting both mortality projections and asset
returns from this point forward. Once the annuity is purchased, however, further
fluctuations in asset returns and the development of mortality compared to the
projections used in pricing the annuity are borne by the insurance company, unless
annuity benefits are indexed for asset returns (a variable annuity) or for mortality
realizations . . . . Annuitization shifts risks after retirement to insurers, but the retiree
still faces the risk of the pricing of annuities at the start of retirement.”); see also
MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 47 (“The only way that a 401(k) participant or a
participant in a new hybrid plan can insure against outliving resources is to purchase an
annuity, and the price of that annuity will largely depend on the interest rate at which
the insurance company can invest its funds. . . . [T]he employer bears this risk.”).
216. See Ezra, supra note 209, at 65 (“[P]eople do not buy annuities voluntarily. They
cite a feeling that in buying an annuity they have lost control of their assets.”); see also
Margaret Collins, Income for Life? Sure, But What Does it Cost?, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, June 27–July 3, 2011, at 47, 47–48 (describing annuity protections as
coming with high cost and many conditions that make comparing and selecting the
appropriate annuity difficult for consumers).
217. See generally Global Financial Stability Report, Chapter 4: The Financial
Impact
of
Longevity
Risk,
IMF
(Apr.
2012),
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2012/01/pdf/c4.pdf (discussing the impact of life
expectancy and health care on longevity risks and financial stability of governments,
private companies and individuals).
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disproportionately affecting women and minority investors.218
Financial literacy deficits make shouldering these burdens
onerous. Additionally, the ERISA framework is not equipped to
address this deficit with minimal resources focused on
voluntary education programs and ineffective participant
disclosures.219 The gamble involved in the defined contribution
society involves potential negative impact on individual and
social financial stability.
V. DILUTED ERISA FIDUCIARY STANDARDS FOR CITIZEN
SHAREHOLDERS
ERISA, which was premised on strong fiduciary duties
and oversight of employers and other designated actors in the
defined benefit context, relaxed, if not eliminated, many of
those protections for self-directed defined contribution
220
As a result, the traditional protections
participants.
associated with retirement benefits are largely absent for the
221
citizen shareholder in a defined contribution plan.
Sponsors and trustees of self-directed defined contribution
plans are subject to fiduciary duties that are diluted in scope and
diffused among various actors, reducing accountability
222
For example, in self-directed
mechanisms and liability.
accounts where participants make investment choices, the
“choice” creates a safe harbor presumption for the employer and
other fiduciaries shielding them against liability.223 The safe
harbor presumption, not present for defined benefit plans, is a
barrier to recovery for investors and illustrates the diluted
ERISA protections for citizen shareholders.224 This Part discusses
218. Lusardi, supra note 183, at 124 (“Financial illiteracy is particularly acute among the
elderly, African-Americans, Hispanics, women, and those with low education levels . . . .”).
219. See supra notes 194–201 and accompanying text (discussing financial education and
disclosures).
220. Muir, supra note 46, at 393–94 (“[ERISA] incorporates, both explicitly and implicitly,
a broad range of fiduciary principles to protect people who participate in and benefit from
private sector employee benefit plans.” (citations omitted)).
221. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text (describing protections for citizen
shareholders).
222. Muir, supra note 46, at 395 (“Unlike traditional trust law, in which each
fiduciary is responsible for all fiduciary obligations owed to the trust, ERISA’s functional
definition of ‘fiduciary’ results in many fiduciaries, each with limited responsibilities.”).
223. ERISA § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2006).
224. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(d)(2)(i) (2012) (“If a participant or beneficiary of an
ERISA section 404(c) plan exercises independent control over assets in his individual
account in the manner described in paragraph (c), then no other person who is a fiduciary
with respect to such plan shall be liable for any loss, or with respect to any breach of part
4 of title I of the Act, that is the direct and necessary result of that participant’s or
beneficiary’s exercise of control.”); see also DiFelice v. US Airways, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 2d
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the fiduciary standards imposed by ERISA, the classification of
fiduciaries, and exceptions to liability, and it examines certain
fee and stock drop cases. This Part also discusses specific defined
contribution causes of action that seek liability despite the “safe
harbor” because certain structural plan decisions, such as
investment options, fees, and plan disclosures, greatly impact
defined contribution plan outcomes for individual participants
and thus warrant accountability to participants.
A. ERISA Fiduciary Duties
ERISA imposes duties on fiduciaries who govern both
defined benefit and defined contribution plans, although, as
discussed below, those duties are diluted with regard to selfdirected defined contribution plans.225 For a plaintiff to
successfully raise a fiduciary duty claim, the action in question
must be taken by a fiduciary, and it must have violated one of the
enumerated fiduciary duties under ERISA.226 If an actor manages
plan assets, renders investment advice, or is vested with
discretionary authority over the plan and is therefore a fiduciary,
such an actor must act (1) “solely in the interest of the plan’s
participants and beneficiaries,” (2) for the exclusive purpose of
“defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan,”
(3) “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence of a prudent
[person]
in
similar
[situations],” (4)
consistent
with
diversification principles, (5) in accordance with plan documents,
and (6) without conflicts of interest or self-dealing.227
ERISA fiduciaries are held to standards described as “the
228
highest known to the law.” Fiduciaries under ERISA have, in
229
name at least, strong, “twin” fiduciary duties of loyalty and
758, 775 (E.D. Va. 2005) (holding that the fiduciary was shielded from liability “even
when the fiduciary arguably may have breached its duties”).
225. See infra Part V (discussing the dilution of fiduciary duties in defined
contribution plans).
226. ERISA § 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109.
227. ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a); KOZAK, supra note 4, at 349–50, 355–57;
see also Borzi, supra note 4, at A-24; Maher & Stris, supra note 88, at 458 (“In virtually
all defined contribution pension plans, promisees rely on plan fiduciaries to perform
functions that are too difficult or costly for promisees to perform on their own. While some
fiduciary obligations, such as the restrictions on ‘prohibited transactions,’ have been
expressed in sets of fairly clear rules, the core aspects of fiduciary duties under ERISA are
expressed and applied as standards—such as the duty to act ‘solely in the interest of
beneficiaries’ and the duty to prudently administer the plan.” (footnotes omitted)).
228. Dudenhoefer v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 692 F.3d 410, 417 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pfeil v. State St. Bank & Trust, 671 F.3d 585, 591 (6th
Cir. 2012)).
229.
“Congress intended that private individuals would play an important role in
enforcing ERISA’s fiduciary duties—duties which have been described as ‘the highest
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prudence.230 The loyalty obligation, established under section
404(a), requires that fiduciaries act “solely in the interest of
[plan] participants and beneficiaries . . . . for the exclusive
purpose of . . . providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries.”231 Fiduciaries must also act to defray the
“reasonable expenses of administering the plan.”232 Fiduciaries
may not, without violating the fiduciary duty of loyalty, act in
favor of a personal benefit or to the benefit of a third party.233
“[M]ost courts have treated the ‘solely in the interest’ and
‘exclusive purpose’ standards interchangeably as codifications
of the trust law duty of undivided loyalty.”234
Fiduciaries observe the second pillar, the duty of
prudence, by executing plan functions “with the care, skill,
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an
235
The
enterprise of a like character and with like aims.”
prudence obligation is an “objective” standard and judicial
inquiries focus on the process undertaken by the fiduciary, not
necessarily the end result.236 A fiduciary must “(1) . . . employ
proper methods to investigate, evaluate and structure the
investment; (2) . . . act in a manner as would others who have
a capacity and familiarity with such matters; and (3) . . .
exercise independent judgment when making investment
decisions.”237 DOL regulations further clarify the prudence
known to the law.’” Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 598 (8th Cir.
2009) (citing Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n. 8 (2d Cir. 1982)).
230.
Id. at 595 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)).
231.
ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
232.
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(ii).
233.
Robert N. Eccles et al., Fiduciary Litigation Under ERISA 21–22 (Dec. 1,
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.asppa.org/DocumentVault/Docs/Conferences/Los%20Angeles%20Benefits%20Conference/2011/ws9.aspx;
see also Chao v. Malkani, 452 F.3d 290, 291, 298–99 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that
fiduciaries breached their duties of loyalty by raiding plan assets); Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. Solmsen, 671 F. Supp. 938, 945–46 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (using plan assets
for corporate purposes violates a fiduciary’s duty of loyalty).
234.
Eccles et al., supra note 233, at 21; see also Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453,
457 (10th Cir. 1978) (treating the standards interchangeably when considering
whether the fiduciary’s responsibilities under ERISA section 404(a)(1) were met).
235.
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
236.
“The statute’s ‘prudent person standard is an objective standard . . . that
focuses on the fiduciary’s conduct preceding the challenged decision.’ In evaluating
whether a fiduciary has acted prudently, we therefore focus on the process by which
it makes its decisions rather than the results of those decisions.” Braden v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 595 (8th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
237.
In re State St. Bank & Trust Fixed Income Funds Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d
614, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting United States v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council of
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standard by requiring fiduciaries to give “appropriate
consideration” to facts relevant to the investment and the
plan’s portfolio.238 With defined contribution plans, the
prudence standard applies primarily to the selection of
investments and administration of the plan, rather than the
performance of individually invested assets.239 In addition to
these twin duties, fiduciaries responsible for governing any
qualified plan have a duty to diversify assets and follow plan
documents.240 The diversification obligation imposes duties on
241
fiduciaries to “minimize the risk of large losses” consistent
with a modern portfolio investment approach of asset
diversification.242 The duty to diversify under ERISA “prohibits
a fiduciary from investing disproportionately in a particular
investment or enterprise.”243 Rather than establishing a
percentage, diversification requirements are based upon the
consideration of factors such as purpose of the plan, amount of
the plan assets, financial conditions, investment type,
distribution among industries, and maturity dates.244 Diversity is
evaluated within each investment option or, when there are
several managers/investment types within a single plan, the

Greater N.Y., 90 F. Supp. 882, 886 (S.D.N.Y 1995)).
238. 29 C.F.R. § 2250.404a-1(b)(1) (2012). Appropriate consideration includes:
(i) a determination by the fiduciary that the particular investment or investment
course of action is reasonably designed, as part of the portfolio (or, where
applicable, that portion of the plan portfolio with respect to which the fiduciary
has investment duties), to further the purposes of the plan, taking into
consideration the risk of loss and the opportunities for gain (or other return)
associated with the investment or investment course of action, and
(ii) Consideration of the following facts as they relate to such [portion of the
portfolio:
(A) The composition of the portfolio with regard to diversification;
(B) The liquidity and current return of the portfolio relative to the anticipated
cash flow requirements of the plan; and
(C) The projected return of the portfolio relative to the funding objectives of the plan.
Id. § 2550.404a-1(b)(2).
239. Emily Adams, Protecting America’s Financial Future: Why Courts Should Enforce
ERISA’s Duties of Prudence and Disclosure, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 345, 349–50 (2011).
240. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A)–(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)–(D).
241. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C).
242. Id.; see also KOZAK, supra note 4, at 356 (“Courts have recently held
that . . . investment diversification should adopt modern portfolio theory.”). For a discussion of
modern portfolio theory, see MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 79, which describes the
portfolios as efficient because “it is not possible to achieve a higher return without taking on
additional risk.”
243. In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 438 (3d Cir. 1996).
244. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5038, 5084–85; see also In re Unisys, 74 F.3d at 438 (listing factors to be considered when
measuring ERISA’s duty to diversify).
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portion of the plan accountable to each fiduciary.245 For example,
in a plan offering mutual fund investments, money market
savings, and bonds, diversification for each of the three types of
investments would be evaluated individually rather than
examining the composite diversification among the three
investment types.246 If a plaintiff establishes a failure to diversify,
the burden then shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the
lack of diversification was prudent.247 The diversification duty is
modified when company stock, in the form of an ESOP, is offered
248
as an investment option within a plan.
B. ERISA Fiduciary Status
Who owes the fiduciary duties described above? ERISA
imposes fiduciary duties on plan fiduciaries like the sponsoring
employer and any entity named in the plan documents,
appointed by the board, or performing “fiduciary functions” for
the plan.249 Determining fiduciary status under ERISA is a
factually and legally complex endeavor, often a primary focus of
250
litigation.
The third category of “functional fiduciary” is
frequently a crucial component of litigation regarding defined
contribution plans in which a host of actors beyond the employer
and designated trustees make structural plan decisions
regarding investment options, plan administration, plan fees,
and plan disclosures.251 For example, within a self-directed
245. In re State St. Bank & Trust Fixed Income Funds Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d 614,
650–51 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting In re Unisys, 74 F.3d at 438–40). Diversification is
measured with respect to the plan assets in question, not with respect to all of the
investments within a plan. See GIW Indus., Inc. v. Trevor, Steward, Burton & Jacobsen,
Inc., 895 F.2d 729, 733 (11th Cir. 1990) (rejecting evaluating diversification of the entire
plan rather than the plan assets in question); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1280 (indicating that
investments within different types of vehicles such as equities or bonds must be
diversified).
246. In re State St. Bank, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 650–51.
247. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1280; see also In re Unisys, 74 F.3d at 438.
248. Publicly traded companies may offer company stock as an investment option in
their 401(k) plans. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B)–(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)–(C) (2006); 29 CFR
§ 2550.404c-1(d)(2)(ii)(E)(4) (2012). Company stock is often offered as a part of an
employee stock ownership plan, also known as an ESOP. “[E]mployer stock regulations
for 401(k) plans with an ESOP differ from those for plans without one.” Choi, Laibson &
Madrian, supra note 119, at 155. For a general discussion of ESOPs and a summary of the
unique standards of review associated with them, see Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 679
F.3d 1267, 1279 (11th Cir. 2012) (describing ESOP standards of review and compliance
duties); see also Jara, supra note 119, at 547–48 (discussing ESOP plans).
249. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A); In re Luna, 406 F.3d 1192, 1201 (10th Cir. 2005).
250. “The determination of an individual’s fiduciary status is an inherently factual
inquiry and will require analysis of the specific facts and circumstances of each case.”
KOZAK, supra note 4, at 350.
251. See, e.g., Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 231 (2000) (holding that eligibility
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defined contribution plan, in addition to the sponsoring employer,
its corporate board, and named fiduciaries or trustee in the plan
documents, there are often also investment advisors who help
populate the plans, investment brokers who administer the
buying and selling of plan assets, administrative/record-keeping
third parties, and then the intermediary managers who manage
participant contributions invested in participating mutual or
index funds.252 Each of these actors impacts individual
performance of retirement accounts, but most are not ERISA
253
fiduciaries. The result is both weakened fiduciary duties and a
narrow scope of who is a fiduciary in the context of self-directed
defined contribution plans, despite a wide range of actors who
influence the structure and administration of the plan.
Determining ERISA fiduciary status requires both a
statutory and a functional analysis. The documentation for each
plan must identify a named fiduciary, who has general fiduciary
responsibility for the entire plan and therefore is a statutory
254
fiduciary. Additionally, to the extent that any person or entity
(i) exercises discretionary authority or control over the
management or payment of assets, (ii) gives investment advice
255
regarding plan assets for any compensation, or (iii) has any
discretionary authority over plan administration, he or she is
acting as a “functional” fiduciary of the plan.256 In applying this
standard, DOL regulations establish that certain positions, such
as a plan trustee or plan administrator, are “fiduciary” by the
nature of the role performed.257 All other determinations depend
upon the nature of the function performed, not just the status or
title of the person or entity acting.258
decisions by the employer are not fiduciary decisions under ERISA).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
255. Definition of the Term “Fiduciary”, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,263-02 (proposed Oct. 22,
2010)
(to
be
codified
at
29
C.F.R.
pt.
2510)
available
at
http://webapps.dol.gov/FederalRegister/HtmlDisplay.aspx?DocId=24328&AgencyId=8&Do
cumentType=1.
256. See Muir, supra note 46, at 395 (explaining that an individual becomes an
ERISA fiduciary when they exercise discretion over the assets, management, or
administration of the plan or they provide investment advice for compensation).
257. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (2012).
258. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993); Beddall v. State St. Bank
& Trust, 137 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1998) (“The statute also extends fiduciary liability to
functional fiduciaries.”); Acosta v. Pac. Enters., 950 F.2d 611, 618 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A
person’s actions, not the official designation of his role, determine whether he enjoys
fiduciary status.”); Deborah S. Davidson & Simon J. Torres, Fiduciary Responsibility
Under ERISA, in 1 ABA 25TH ANNUAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON ERISA BASICS, at B-19
(2011).
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The control standard is a high threshold to meet, and
mere participation in a plan will not satisfy it for purposes of
259
For example, a broker
attaching fiduciary standards.
administering a self-directed defined contribution plan would
not incur liability for those functions unless the broker had
control over the plan assets or provided advice to plan
260
participants. In Hecker v. Deere Co., the plaintiffs alleged
that Fidelity Trust, the broker for the defined contribution
plan, “played a role in” selecting the list of funds included in
261
the plan from which participants had to invest. The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the
plaintiffs’ complaint, distinguishing control that would give
rise to liability from merely “play[ing] a role” in plan fund
selections.262 The defined contribution plan in Hecker contained
twenty “primary” mutual funds in the plan as well as a
brokerage window option that granted investors access to a
broader range of securities—2,500 investments traded on
public indices.263 By assisting in selecting the twenty “primary”
funds, the broker did not exercise control sufficient to establish
fiduciary status and attach corresponding fiduciary duties.264
Additionally, ERISA fiduciary standards only apply to the
265
extent that an actor is engaged in a fiduciary function. For
example, courts applying ERISA case law recognize that
employers and other actors can wear “two hats” and only be
exposed to liability when performing a plan fiduciary
function.266 This is particularly applicable to employers who
259. Beddall, 137 F.3d at 17–18 (affirming the dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint
because the Bank retained no discretionary authority over the plan’s real estate
investments).
260. See Kerns v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 214, 217–18 (8th Cir. 1993)
(“Persons who provide professional services to plan administrators ‘are not ERISA
fiduciaries unless they transcend the normal role’ and exercise discretionary authority.”
(quoting Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 669 (8th Cir. 1992))).
261. “Each plan participant decided for herself where to put her 401(k) dollars; the
only limitation was that the investment vehicle had to be one offered by the Plan. Each
fund included within the Plans charged a fee, calculated as a percentage of assets the
investor placed with it.” Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 578, 584 (7th Cir. 2009).
262. “There is an important difference between an assertion that a firm exercised
‘final authority’ over the choice of funds, on the one hand, and an assertion that a firm
simply ‘played a role’ in the process, on the other hand.” Id. at 584.
263. Id. at 581.
264. Id. at 583–84.
265. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2006); see also Beddall v. State St. Bank & Trust, 137
F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[F]iduciary status is not an all or nothing proposition; the
statutory language indicates that a person is a plan fiduciary only ‘to the extent’ that he
possesses or exercises the requisite discretion or control.”).
266. The “two hats” doctrine provides that when an individual is acting in a
corporate capacity on behalf of the company, ERISA’s fiduciary duties are not implicated.
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engage in many activities that are outside of the scope of the
ERISA framework.267 Additionally, ERISA contains specific
disclaimers of fiduciary responsibility with regard to what are
268
called “settlor” functions of a plan. Settlor functions include
“establishing, funding, amending, and terminating” the benefit
plan.269 In this regard, the fiduciary standard only attaches to a
fiduciary actor when it is engaged in a fiduciary function such as
managing plan assets, giving investment advice, or exercising
discretion over the plan.270 Although a fiduciary can wear two
hats, it must wear only one at a time and it always wears the
“fiduciary hat when making fiduciary decisions.”271
ERISA establishes a complex and seemingly comprehensive
framework of protections for participants with both named and
functional fiduciaries and duties that range from broad concepts
such as loyalty and prudence to specific duties regarding
272
This
disclosures, fees, and diversification obligations.
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 225–26 (2000) (noting that the employer can switch
between wearing its “fiduciary” and “employer” hats); see also Holdeman v. Devine, 474
F.3d 770, 778 (10th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that an employer can wear two hats as a
fiduciary and a non-fiduciary employer).
267. Some ERISA-related actions are not fiduciary functions. Those actions, called
settlor functions, include “establishing, designing, amending or terminating an ERISA
plan” as those decisions relate to the voluntary nature of pension benefits rather than
administering them once promised. See, e.g., Davidson & Torres, supra note 258, at B-21.
“The critical distinction for purposes of fiduciary obligation, and ultimately for liability,
lies in the line drawn between implementation actions, such as the misrepresentations
made by Varity, and settlor actions, such as the participant transfers made by B.F.
Goodrich or the benefit amendments made by Hughes Aircraft.” Muir, supra note 46, at
431.
268. See C.F.R. § 2509.75-8, D-2 (2012) (asserting that a person is a fiduciary only if they
perform one or more of the functions described in section 3(21)(A) of ERISA with respect to an
employee benefit plan). Common ministerial functions include applying eligibility rules,
calculating services, preparing employee communications, maintaining employee service
records, preparing reports required by the federal government such as form 5550, calculating
benefits, orienting new participants, collecting contributions, preparing participant benefit
reports, processing claims, and making third-party recommendations regarding plan
administration. Davidson & Torres, supra note 258, at B-34 to B-35.
269. Adams v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., 199 F. App’x 405, 407 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing
Hunter v. Caliber Sys., Inc., 220 F.3d 702, 718 (6th Cir. 2000)); see also Ames v. Am. Nat’l Can
Co., 170 F.3d 751, 757 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[W]hen company representatives . . . are not acting in
their capacity as a plan fiduciary . . . they do not bear the legal obligations that go along with
fiduciary status.”).
270. “[D]espite whatever harm counterclaim defendants may have done to ULLICO, they
cannot, as a matter of law, be liable under ERISA’s fiduciary provisions for decisions they
made as corporate officers.” In re Ullico Inc. Litig., 605 F. Supp. 2d 210, 220 (D.D.C. 2009).
When an employer acts in its corporate capacity, not as a fiduciary, it is performing what is
called settlor functions. See, e.g., Beck v. PACE Int’l Union, 551 U.S. 96, 101 (2007) (“It is well
established . . . that an employer’s decision whether to terminate an ERISA plan is a settlor
function immune from ERISA’s fiduciary obligations.”).
271. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 225 (2000).
272. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2006).
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framework is eroded in the context of self-directed defined
contribution plans, and the protections offered to citizen
shareholders are substantially weakened.
C. Fiduciary Duty Liability and Exceptions
ERISA section 409 establishes personal liability for any
fiduciary breaching “any responsibilities, obligations, or duties
imposed upon fiduciaries by [ERISA].”273 Section 502(a) of
ERISA creates a private right of action for plan losses and
enumerates the civil actions that investors may bring against
fiduciaries for a breach of fiduciary duty.274 In LaRue v.
DeWolff, Boberg & Associates, the U.S. Supreme Court
affirmed that defined contribution participants have a cause of
action against plan fiduciaries “whose alleged misconduct
impaired the value of plan assets in the participant’s
275
individual account.”
Importantly, LaRue established that
participants could seek recovery for losses suffered to their
individual accounts that were a part of defined contribution
plan assets, distinguishing it from precedent that prohibited
individual relief, such as consequential damages for delayed
payment of benefits.276
273. Id. § 1109(a).
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the
responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall
be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting
from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary
which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and
shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem
appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary . . . .
Id.
274. Id. § 1132. Section 502 also vests the Secretary of Labor as well as plan
participants and beneficiaries with the right to bring actions on behalf of the plan for
obligations defined in section 409(a). ERISA and securities cases may overlap. Securities
fraud (or any derivative claim) cases are typically combined in a consolidated proceeding
of multi-district litigation (MDL) before one judge. Clovis Trevino Bravo, ERISA
Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure Claims: Securities Litigation Under the Guise of
ERISA?, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 497, 527 (2009). Under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), a mandatory stay of discovery is imposed pending a
ruling on a motion to dismiss. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006). Because these cases are
coordinated with ERISA-based claims where there is no such stay, an exception is made
for ERISA-unique discovery. See, e.g., Robert Rachal et al., ERISA Fiduciary Duties
Regarding 401(k) & ESOP Investments in Employer Stock, in 2 ABA 25TH ANNUAL
NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON ERISA BASICS, at M-14 (2011) (discussing PSLRA stays in
conjunction with ERISA-based discovery). Coordinating the procedure of such combined
cases raises complex issues beyond the scope of this Article. For a thorough discussion of
such issues, see Bravo, supra, at 527 (describing the procedural and substantive
requirements of lawsuits actionable under ERISA and securities law).
275. LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 250 (2008).
276. Id. at 256; Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140 (1985).
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1. Exceptions: Safe Harbors and Discretionary Deference.
Because of clarification by LaRue that ERISA private rights of
action extend to defined contribution participants, ERISA
277
appears to provide rigorous protections for all investors. Two
exemptions, however, substantially erode those protections.
The first is the safe harbor for self-directed accounts briefly
278
discussed above.
The second is judicial deference to
discretion in decision-making.279
Self-directed accounts, like those in a 401(k), eliminate the
need for an employer or other designated third-party to
perform many benefit activities that would be considered
fiduciary functions under a defined benefit plan, such as
investment allocation, funding, and future payments, because
those functions are shifted to the citizen shareholders to
280
perform. As a result, section 404(c) of ERISA establishes for
fiduciaries an affirmative defense against plan losses if
participants exercised control over their accounts in making
281
investment allocations. This affirmative defense, referred to
282
as the safe harbor, shields a fiduciary from liability “even
when the fiduciary arguably may have breached its duties.”283
The limited scope of fiduciary liability for self-directed
accounts contributed to the rise of the defined contribution
society and also highlights a limitation of ERISA in protecting
284
individual retirement benefits.
277. LaRue, 552 U.S. at 256.
278. See supra notes 223–24 and accompanying text.
279. Discretion, a factor crucial in determining fiduciary status, is also a key factor is
determining deference, and therefore a significant limitation to finding liability for violated
fiduciary standards. Muir, supra note 46, at 410.
280.
For defined contribution plans that do not offer the option of investment selfdirection, the promisor’s fiduciary role is obvious and enormous: the fiduciary is
actively deciding how to invest assets beneficially owned by the plan participant. But
even for plans that do offer self-directed accounts (and with respect to promisees who
exercise that option), residual fiduciary duties remain.
Maher & Stris, supra note 88, at 458 n.124.
281. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2006).
282.
If a participant or beneficiary of an ERISA section 404(c) plan exercises independent
control over assets in his individual account in the manner described in paragraph
(c), then no other person who is a fiduciary with respect to such plan shall be liable
for any loss, or with respect to any breach of part 4 of title I of the Act, that is the
direct and necessary result of that participant’s or beneficiary’s exercise of control.
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(d)(2)(i) (2012).
283.
DiFelice v. US Airways, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 2d 758, 775 (E.D. Va. 2005).
284.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (limiting fiduciary liability when a participant
exercises independent control of individual account assets); see also Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556
F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]o the extent participants incurred excessive expenses, those
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To qualify for the affirmative defense provided in section
404(c), fiduciaries must establish three elements: (1) the plan at
issue offers an individual account over which the participant
exercised control, (2) participants must have actually exercised
control as authorized under the plan, and (3) the loss or the breach
285
must be the “result of a participant’s exercise of control.” The first
two elements—available control and exercised control—are fairly
straightforward tests established by ERISA and supporting DOL
regulations.286 In addition to establishing participant control,
fiduciaries must establish that the plan included “a sufficient
range of options so that the participants have control over the
risk of loss.”287 A sufficient range of options, which means a
choice of at least three investment options, is necessary
because it facilitates participants’ control over return and risk
potential and creates an ability to diversify holdings.288
Participants in self-directed defined contribution plans
make final investment allocation decisions, which give rise to
the safe harbor protections, but there are a myriad of decisions
made by employers, trustees, named fiduciaries, investment
advisors, brokers, and employer pension committees to select
and monitor investment options available in a plan, the fees
charged, and the information disseminated to participants.289
“In virtually all defined contribution pension plans, promisees
rely on plan fiduciaries to perform functions that are too
difficult or costly for promisees to perform on their own.”290 I
losses were the result of participants exercising control over their investments within the
meaning of the safe harbor provision.”).
285. DiFelice, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 775–76.
286.
Individual accounts under ERISA are defined in ERISA section 3(34). 29
U.S.C. § 1002(34). DOL regulations establish a test for determining control if the
participant is allowed to:
(1) Choose from a broad range of investment alternatives . . . each of which
has materially different risk and return characteristics;
(2) give investment instructions with a frequency appropriate in light of the
volatility of the investment alternatives . . . ;
(3) diversify investments within and among in investment alternatives; and
(4) obtain sufficient information to make informed investment decisions with
respect to investment alternatives available under the plan.
Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans (ERISA
Section 404(c) Plans), 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (1992).
287. Hecker, 556 F.3d at 589.
288. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c–1(b)(3)(i)(A)–(C) (2012) (defining a “broad range of
investment alternatives”).
289. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A); see also In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 683
F. Supp. 2d 294, 298–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (stating that corporate directors who had not
been named fiduciaries by the plan did not act as fiduciaries when making administrative
plan decision such as appointing the plan committee).
290. Maher & Stris, supra note 88, at 458.
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refer to these preparticipant investment decisions as
structural plan decisions. The safe harbor is an affirmative
defense to many, but not all, liabilities regarding these
structural plan decisions.291
Many structural plan decisions require discretionary
decision-making. Courts give fiduciaries’ discretionary
decision-making deference and only find fault if such actions
292
are arbitrary and capricious—a high standard. “Where [an]
ERISA plan administrator has ‘discretion,’ i.e., applies his own
judgment in making plan decisions, court[s] review[] benefits
decisions under arbitrary and capricious standard, which is
293
substantively the same as abuse of discretion standard.” A
fiduciary’s actions will be overturned only if they were taken
in bad faith, lacked “factual foundation,” or were not
294
supported by substantial evidence. The high standard of
review is intended to limit excessive judicial intervention so
that courts may not substitute their own interpretations of
plan provisions for a rational interpretation offered by the
plan’s fiduciaries.295
The safe harbor and discretionary deference create incentives
for employer sponsors to (1) provide or convert existing pension
benefits into a self-directed defined contribution model where
employees perform functions that would otherwise give rise to
fiduciary liability; and (2) grant “discretionary authority” to named
fiduciaries or delegated/designated parties in the plan document
296
Additionally, because
which ensures deferential review.
291. Id. at 458 n.124.
292.
As explained above, one of the determinative factors of ERISA fiduciary status is the
presence of discretion in decisionmaking [sic]. Ironically, although the presence of
discretion may mean that a plan actor is a fiduciary, that same discretion often
protects a fiduciary’s decisions from serious scrutiny. The relevant jurisprudence has
established that, when a plan document reserves discretion to a fiduciary decision
maker, the fiduciary’s decisions will be reversed only if they are found to be arbitrary
and capricious. Even the decisions of a self-interested fiduciary frequently receive
some level of deference.
Muir, supra note 46, at 410.
293. Laura Dietz et al., Plan Administration: Standards of Care for Fiduciaries: Arbitrary
and Capricious Standard of Review, 60A AM. JUR. 2D PENSIONS § 439 (2012) (citing Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)); see also
Lipsey v. Union Underwear Pension Plan, 146 F. App’x 326, 330 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that
the employer’s determination of plan eligibility was not arbitrary and capricious).
294. Dietz et al., supra note 293, § 439.
295. Cook v. Pension Plan for Salaried Emps. of Cyclops Corp., 801 F.2d 865, 869–71 (6th
Cir. 1986); Offutt v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 735 F.2d 948, 950 (5th Cir. 1984).
296.
Nonetheless, in a regrettable and unnecessary detour, the Court declared that
deferential review would be required where the plan ‘gives the administrator or
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fiduciaries are often tasked with determining the scope of the plans’
obligations and needs, once such a decision is made, it is then
protected from rigorous judicial review, which in turn creates an
incentive for drafting vague and ambiguous plan documents to
facilitate as much deferential discretion as possible.297 The combined
effect of the safe harbor resulting from self-directed accounts and
the judicial deference afforded to discretionary decisions
significantly erodes ERISA protections for citizen shareholders.
2. Defined Contribution Liability in Practice. Participants
in self-directed defined contribution plans bring several types of
fiduciary duty cases such as nondisclosure of required plan
documents, misrepresentation of material facts or plan changes,
excessive fees, conflicts of interest, failure of diversification, and
298
stock drop cases. These claims, however, are rarely successful
because of the safe harbor and deferential review procedural
barriers discussed above.299 The result is harsh and is crucial in
understanding the limited oversight afforded defined
contribution plans. This observation is not a critique of the
absence of employer liability per se, but instead seeks to
highlight the liability discrepancy between defined benefit and
defined contribution plans and the resulting decreased oversight.
fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe
the terms of the plan.’ The only limit the Firestone Court announced on deferential
review was that a reviewing court must consider a fiduciary’s actual conflict of
interest as “a ‘facto[r] in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion.”’ In
other words: plans could simply write discretionary authority—and thus deferential
review—into the plan document, and even in the presence of a conflict of interest,
courts must use an abuse-of-discretion review, modified in some unspecified way by
the presence of the conflict.
Maher & Stris, supra note 88, at 471–72 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)).
297.
[T]he fiduciary has the right to determine the existence and scope of the plan’s
obligations to participants and beneficiaries. Once made, the fiduciary’s
determination will be reviewed by the courts only for abuse of discretion. The
incentives are such that this combination of power to interpret and protection
from serious scrutiny might be expected to encourage the drafting of ambiguous
plan documents and the avoidance of specificity in benefit obligations.
Muir, supra note 46, at 413.
298. See, e.g., Kirschbaum v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 526 F.3d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 2008)
(involving a claim relating to a company having invested nearly all of the plan’s funds in
itself, and finding the company failed to act prudently following a drop in the stock price
causing the plan’s assets to decrease); Adams, supra note 239, at 351–53 (discussing
claims brought due to nondisclosure of plan documents, misrepresentation of material
facts or plan changes, and excessive fees and revenue sharing).
299. See Charles C. Jackson et al., Who May Sue You and Why: How to Reduce Your
ERISA Risks, and the Role of Fiduciary Liability Insurance, CHUBB 12–14 (June 2010),
http://www.chubb.com/businesses/csi/chubb12107.pdf;
supra
notes
278–79
and
accompanying text.
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Defined benefit participants have a wider safety net of
protections and accountability mechanisms, including fiduciary
liability.
Disputes over defined contribution plan fees and expenses,
the focus of this Subpart, are a common form of recent litigation
and raise both duty of disclosure and duty of prudence issues.300
Fiduciaries have an obligation to administer plan duties with
reasonable fees and must attempt to defray unnecessary fees as a
301
part of their prudence obligation. The essence of fee litigation
cases is that “the [plan] fiduciaries had an obligation to avoid
higher than necessary fees in the mutual fund options offered in
302
a plan menu, and failed to do so.”
For the most part,
administrative fees associated with self-directed defined
contribution plans303 are borne by plan participants, one of the
many shifts from employer to employee responsibility that
occurs in our defined contribution society.304 Fee litigation
300. Adams, supra note 239, at 353 (“Confusion about the extent of the duty of
disclosure and the role of the duty of prudence manifests itself in excessive fee and
revenue-sharing cases.”).
301. ERISA § 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2006).
302. Stephen D. Rosenberg, Retreat from the High Water Mark: Breach of Fiduciary
Duty Claims Involving Excessive Fees After Tibble v. Edison International, J. PENSION
BENEFITS, Spring 2011, at 12, 13.
303.
Fees and expenses include one-time load fees such as front-end (a
percentage deduction at the time of purchase) and back-end fees (a percentage
deduction at the time of withdrawal) that essentially act as a transaction
commission. Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses, SEC (Jan. 15, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mffees.htm (describing common fees and expenses
charged with mutual fund investments). The second category is annual expenses, also
called expense ratios, which are 12b-1 fees and management fees paid to investment
advisors for overseeing the fund’s portfolio. Id. 12b-1 fees include distribution fees
and shareholder service expenses. “‘Distribution fees’ include fees paid for marketing
and selling fund shares, such as compensating brokers and others who sell fund
shares, and paying for advertising, the printing and mailing of prospectuses to new
investors, and the printing and mailing of sales literature.” Id. Shareholder services
expenses include “fees paid to persons to respond to investor inquiries and provide
investors with information about their investments.” Id.; see also MUNNELL &
SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 77 (describing 12b-1 fees as “annual fees paid out of fund
assets to cover commissions to salespersons and brokers, advertising costs, and other
services” ranging between “0.25 percent and 1.0 percent of assets”).
304.
See, e.g., Advisory Opinion Guidance: Guidance on Settlor v. Plan Expenses,
DEP’ T OF L ABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/AOs/settlor_guidance.html (last visited
Sept. 20, 2013) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion Guidance] (responding to questions
concerning the extent that plans may pay expenses that could be viewed as
conferring a benefit on the plan sponsor).
Employers sometimes confuse plan-related business expenses—which aren’t
payable from plan assets—with plan administration expenses. The U.S.
Department of Labor (DOL) has long held that costs incurred to design,
establish, and terminate plans—so-called ‘settlor functions’—are not
reasonable expenses of administering a plan. These expenses are incurred
for the benefit of the employer and involve services the employer can
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cases highlight the limitation of participant choice and how the
plan structure, established by the employer and other
fiduciaries, significantly impacts plan performance.305 The fee
litigation cases illustrate the substantive limits of fiduciary
duties as applied to citizen shareholders, who are precluded
from protection on decisions that substantially impact
306
participants’ choice and individual savings.
Plan fees and expenses are a crucial element of any plan
and have great impact on plan performance because high fees
307
The
diminish plan savings and earnings over time.
relationship between fees/expenses and fund performance is
the basis of such claims—that a failure to reduce fees and
expenses substantially impacts the accumulated retirement
savings available to participants.308 Under the terms of the
self-directed defined contribution plan, participants have
control over the allocation of their accounts to various
investment options offered, but no control over the fees and
309
expenses charged for each option. Participants therefore rely
reasonably be expected to pay in the normal course of its business
operations.
Baden Retirement Plan Services, BENEFITS ADVANTAGE, http://www.badenrps.com/
document-view/benefits-advantage-fall-2009 (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
305. See John J. Topoleski, Fee Disclosure in Defined Contribution Retirement Plans:
Background and Legislation, CONG. RES. SERVICE 1 (Jan. 29, 2010), available at
http://www.aging.senate.gov/crs/pension37.pdf (noting that small differences in the fees
charged to 401(k) plan participants can “yield large differences in account balances at
retirement”); Advisory Opinion Guidance, supra note 304 (identifying how plan
performance is impacted by employer choices in various hypothetical scenarios).
306. Topoleski, supra note 305, at 1–2.
307. Rosenberg, supra note 302, at 13 (“The interrelated problem for plan participants,
however, and which amplifies the risk posed to participants by high fees, is the corollary
finding that higher feeds do not correspond to equivalently higher returns under mutual funds,
which make up much of the investment menu open to 401(k) plan participants.”).
[T]he market mechanism might be inefficient in the market for advice. Advice
markets suffer by definition from information asymmetries between providers and
recipients. In markets with inattentive consumers and shrouded attributes, perverse
situations with high fees can persist as bona fide economic equilibria when there are
enough naive consumers and the only profitable business model is to offer a product
with low base prices and high “surprise” fees . . . . Are professional fiduciaries
trustworthy or not? There is much anecdotal evidence of problems, for example of
outrageously high fees, but a systematic quantification is needed.
Agarwal et al., supra note 58, at 92–93 (citations omitted).
308. “[T]he amount of fees contained in mutual funds or other investment options in a
401(k) plan significantly impacts the long-term outcome for plan participants.” Rosenberg,
supra note 302, at 13.
309.
Id.
A compounding . . . problem for both plan participants and fiduciaries is
that, under the operation of a 401(k) plan, large numbers of plan
participants are limited to the investment options provided in a plan
menu. . . . [P]lan participants have limited, if any, control over the fees they
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upon fiduciaries to monitor and evaluate the costs associated
with plan investments.
Many fee cases also address the related problem of revenue
sharing where a portion of fees charged on the mutual fund options
are used to offset administrative costs of the plan.310 Under a
revenue sharing arrangement in defined contribution plans, high
plan fees “reduce or effectively eliminate the plan [employer’s] own
costs in offering a 401(k) plan . . .”311 Because high fees erode
individual account savings, revenue sharing “creates a potential
tension between the short-term financial interests of the plan
sponsor and the long-term financial interests of plan participants,”
which if proven could create the basis for a breach of fiduciary duty
of loyalty claim.312
Additionally, revenue sharing practices were the basis of duty
of disclosure claims where the plaintiffs argued that employers
failed to adequately disclose the nature and extent of the
313
revenue sharing arrangements. DOL final rules, proposed in
February 2012, require additional participant disclosures
regarding administrative fees, individual expense information,
and quarterly statements “showing the dollar amount of the
plan-related fees and expenses (whether ‘administrative’ or
‘individual’) actually charged to or deducted from their
individual accounts, along with a description of the services for
which the charge or deduction was made.”314 The DOL rules
clarified obligations for disclosing revenue sharing practices. If
pay to invest for retirement. . . . They
the . . . decisions made by the plan’s fiduciary.

are . . . at

the

mercy

of

Id.
310. Id. (“Many so-called ‘excessive fee’ claims also attack the alleged problem of revenue
sharing, in which a portion of the fees in the mutual fund options themselves are used to fund
the administration of the plan.”).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. The Eighth Circuit refused to declare that revenue sharing and disclosures related
thereto could not be the basis of a breach of fiduciary duty claim. Finding those types of claims
to be “fact and context sensitive” and should not be decided as a matter of law. Braden v. WalMart Stores, 588 F.3d 585, 600 (8th Cir. 2009).
314. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-5(c) (2012); Fact Sheet, supra note 187. Beginning in 2009,
employer sponsors were also required to disclosure revenue sharing practices on form 5550
filed with the DOL to include
(1) identifying information for all direct and indirect compensation over $5000,
(2) the types of services being provided, (3) the relationship of the service provider to
the plan and any party in interest, (4) whether the indirect fees are eligible or
ineligible indirect compensation, and (5) whether any service provider failed or
refused to provide the fee disclosure information necessary to complete Schedule C.
Kathryn L. Moore, 401(k) Plan Fees: A Trifecta of Governmental Oversight, in NYU
REVIEW OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 17-1, 17-5 to 17-6
(Alvin Lurie ed., 2009) (citations omitted).
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employer sponsors comply with DOL disclosure rules for
revenue sharing practices, they will avoid disclosure-based
liability.
A trio of recent cases explored fiduciary liability for high fees
charged by plan trustees and the investment advisors,315 which were
316
passed through by employers as well as revenue-sharing practices
between the fiduciaries. In the 2009 case of Hecker v. Deere & Co.,
the Seventh Circuit was the first appellate court to rule on the
excessive fee issue. At issue in the case was whether the employer
violated its fiduciary duties to participants by offering investment
options with excessive fees and not disclosing a revenue sharing
provision between it and the plan administrators.317 The excessive
fee claim that remained against the employer alleged that the fees
charged to participants were the same as those paid by retail
315.
Ultimately, the court denied employer liability finding that the participants
were advised of the total fee amounts charged to each account and that participants were
able to select lower fee alternatives available through an open broker window that offered
over 2,500 retail mutual funds. Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 586, 590 (7th Cir.
2009); see also Jeffrey D. Mamorsky, DOL Fee Disclosure Regulations and Litigation Creates
Havoc for Plan Sponsor Fiduciaries, J. COMPENSATION & BENEFITS, Sept./Oct. 2012, at 1
(discussing recent litigation about fiduciary duties and high plan fees charged to
participants). In 2009, the Eighth Circuit reversed a dismissal of excessive fee claims in
Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores. Braden, 588 F.3d at 589. The court concluded that the plaintiff
alleged sufficient facts to withstand dismissal and remanded the case. Id. at 595. Among
these facts were that plan funds charged high market fees while underperforming, that all
fees were paid by plan assets and thus depleted retirees’ accounts, that participants were
charged retail fees, that fees were not evaluated in plan selection, and that the revenue
sharing arrangement was not adequately disclosed. Id. at 598–99. A 2012 district court case
evaluating similar issues determined that if a fiduciary is paid via revenue sharing, “it must
also have gone through a deliberative process for determining why such a choice is in the
Plan’s and participants’ best interest.” Tussey v. ABB, Inc., 2:06-CV-04305-NKL, 2012 WL
1113291, at *16 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012), amended in part sub nom. Tussey v. ABB Inc.,
06-4305-CV-C-NKL, 2012 WL 2368471 (W.D. Mo. June 21, 2012), reconsideration denied,
2:06-CV-04305-NKL, 2012 WL 5512389 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 14, 2012) (pending on appeal before
the Eighth Circuit). The district court found after a four-week bench trial that the employer
sponsor failed to reasonably monitor the expenses paid by participants in breach of the
fiduciary obligation to do so. Id. at *35. The employer sponsor failed to calculate the total
amount paid for recordkeeping fees, was unaware that it could leverage the plan’s size, was
informed by an outside consultant that it was paying too much for fees, had not determined
if it was paying a favorable rate for administrative services, and was unaware of general
market prices for “comparable recordkeeping fees”. Id. at *10.
316. Many fee cases also address the related problem of revenue sharing “in which a
portion of the fees in the mutual fund options themselves are used to fund the
administration of the plan.” Rosenberg, supra note 302, at 13; see also Hecker, 556 F.3d at
586. Under a revenue sharing arrangement in defined contribution plans, high plan fees
“reduce or effectively eliminate the plan [employer’s] own costs in offering a 401(k)
plan . . . .” Rosenberg, supra note 302, at 13. Because high fees erode individual account
savings, revenue sharing therefore “creates a potential tension between the short-term
financial interests of the plan sponsor and the long-term financial interests of plan
participants” which if proven could create the basis for a breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty
claim. Id.
317. Hecker, 556 F.3d at 578.
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investors who invest individually and outside of a specific plan.318
For example, if an individual investor purchased mutual fund
shares through eTrade, the “retail” investor would have been
charged the same administrative fees and expenses as a
participant in the employer-sponsored plan. The argument
here is analogous to buying group health insurance because
group purchases through an employer-sponsored plan should
yield lower premiums for participants than an individual going
to the market to obtain private health insurance.319 The
plaintiffs argued that paying retail fees was excessive in the
context of the bulk buying power in an employer-sponsored
plan.320
Revenue sharing claims, on the other hand, challenged
how the fees were paid, not the amount of the fee.321 The
plaintiffs also alleged that Fidelity Research, the plan advisor,
shared its revenue earned from mutual fund fees with Fidelity
Trust, the plan trustee.322 Fidelity Trust applied the fee
revenues to administrative expenses rather than charging
Deere directly for its services.323 The basic argument with
revenue sharing claims is that participants were charged
higher fees in order to offset administrative service fees that
would otherwise have been paid by the employer-sponsor.324
318.
Importantly, all of these funds were also offered to investors in the general
public, and so the expense ratios necessarily were set against the backdrop of
market competition. The fact that it is possible that some other funds might
have had even lower ratios is beside the point; nothing in ERISA requires every
fiduciary to scour the market to find and offer the cheapest possible fund (which
might, of course, be plagued by other problems.
Id. at 586.
319. Steve Sternberg, Mistakes to Avoid When Buying Health Insurance, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REPORT (Aug. 7, 2012), http://health.usnews.com/health-news/healthinsurance/articles/2012/08/07/mistakes-to-avoid-when-buying-health-insurance.
320. Hecker, 556 F.3d at 579 (“None of the Fidelity Research funds operated
exclusively for Deere employees; all were available on the open market for the same fee.”).
321. Id. at 585.
322. Id. at 578.
323. Id.
The Hecker group alleges that Fidelity Research shared its revenue, which it earned
from the mutual fund fees, with Fidelity Trust. Fidelity Trust in turn compensated
itself through those shared fees, rather than through a direct charge to Deere for its
services as trustee. As the Hecker group sees it, this led to a serious—in fact,
impermissible—lack of transparency in the fee structure, because the mutual fund
fees were devoted not only to the (proper) cost of managing the funds, but also to the
(improper) cost of administering Deere’s 401(k) plans.
Id.
324. Id. at 579; see also Tussey v. ABB, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-04305-NKL, 2012 WL 1113291,
at *9 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 31, 2012) (explaining that participants pay for revenue sharing expenses
because such expenses are paid from the investment’s assets). The prospectus for each
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The Seventh Circuit concluded, however, that high retail
fees did not breach a fiduciary duty because participants were
offered alternative investment options through an open
brokerage window and therefore were not necessarily required
325
to pay the high fees. Thus, variety in investment options
cured the high retail fees paid in the traditional, and most
326
Similarly, the court held that revenue
selected, options.
sharing of administrative fees did not breach a fiduciary duty
and that there was no duty to disclose the fee-sharing
327
relationship. As noted above, DOL regulations have since
expanded employer disclosure obligations with regard to
revenue sharing practices requiring quarterly statements of
328
actual expenses charged to individual accounts.
Later in 2009, the Eighth Circuit reversed a dismissal of
329
The
excessive fee claims in Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores.
complaint raised several specific claims which collectively
alleged a breach of fiduciary duty by the employer for failing to
adequately “evaluate the investment options included in the
Plan” and challenged the process by which funds were selected
for inclusion in the plan, asserting that high fees and revenue
sharing practices influenced final decisions.330 The Eighth
investment includes an expense ratio which affects the net asset value of investments.
Investment expenses are paid from the assets of the investment, and therefore investors
themselves pay the investment’s expenses. Id. When those expenses are shared with other
plan administrators and cover such expenses as recordkeeping or trustee services, the practice
is called revenue sharing. Like other aspects of the defined contribution model, here the
administrative costs of the plan are shifted away from the employer sponsor to the employee
participant. Id.
325. Hecker, 556 F.3d at 586.
326. The plan investments provided by Deere included “23 different Fidelity mutual
funds, two investment funds managed by Fidelity Trust, a fund devoted to Deere’s stock, and a
Fidelity-operated facility called BrokerageLink, which gave participants access to some 2,500
additional funds managed by different companies.” Id. at 578.
327.
Id. at 585–87.
328.
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-5(c) (2012).
The long-awaited and recently finalized fee disclosure regulations are likely
to add fuel to the excessive fee case trend . . . . The new
regulations . . . require “transparency of fees” by service providers in order
to better enable plan fiduciaries to select among them . . . . In view of the
DOL’s stated rationale of requiring more transparency of fees and the
industry’s resistance to providing anything more than the currently
disclosed expense ratio, the arena of required fee disclosure is likely to be a
hotbed of disputes to come.
Capobianco & Jara, supra note 49, at *5.
329.
Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 589–90 (8th Cir. 2009).
330.
Braden filed his complaint . . . alleging five causes of action against WalMart and the individual appellees, executives serving on or responsible for
overseeing the Retirement Plans Committee. The gravamen of the complaint
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Circuit concluded that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to
withstand dismissal and remanded the case.331 Among these
facts were that plan funds charged high market fees while
underperforming, that all fees were paid by plan assets and
thus depleted retirees’ accounts, that participants were
charged retail fees, that fees were not evaluated in plan
selection, and that the revenue sharing arrangement was not
adequately disclosed.332 The parties reached a settlement
agreement in December 2011, when the defendants agreed to
pay over $13.5 million in damages and make changes to the
plan, including increased participant education, decreased
retail-fee charging investment options, and enhanced fee
333
disclosures consistent with proposed DOL regulations.
A 2012 district court case evaluating similar issues
determined that if a fiduciary is paid via revenue sharing, “it
must also have gone through a deliberative process for
determining why such a choice is in the Plan’s and participants’
334
Once again the revenue sharing practices
best interest.”
between Fidelity Trust and Fidelity Research were at issue.335
The district court found after a four-week bench trial that the
employer sponsor failed to reasonably monitor the expenses
paid by participants in breach of the fiduciary obligation to do
so.336 The employer sponsor failed to calculate the total amount
paid for recordkeeping fees, was unaware that it could
leverage the plan’s size, was informed by an outside consultant
that it was paying too much for fees, had not determined if it
was paying a favorable rate for administrative services, and
was unaware of general market prices for “comparable
recordkeeping fees.”337
is that appellees failed adequately to evaluate the investment options
included in the Plan. It alleges that the process by which the mutual funds
were selected was tainted by appellees’ failure to consider trustee Merrill
Lynch’s interest in including funds that shared their fees with the trustee.
The result of these failures . . . is that some or all of the investment options
included in the Plan charge excessive fees.
Id.
331.
Id. at 591.
332.
Id. at 598–99.
333. William P. Barrett, Walmart, Merrill Lynch Agree to Pay $13.5 Million to Settle
401(k) Fiduciary Lawsuit, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2011, 6:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
williampbarrett/2011/12/05/walmart-merrill-lynch-agree-to-pay-13-5-million-to-settle401k-fiduciary-lawsuit/.
334. Tussey v. ABB, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-04305-NKL, 2012 WL 1113291, at *16 (W.D.
Mo. Mar. 31, 2012).
335. Id. at *1–2.
336. Id. at *2, *10.
337. Id. at *10.
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Failure of oversight in light of plan statements that
revenue sharing would be used to “offset or reduce
338
recordkeeping costs” resulted in a breach of fiduciary duty.
Employers cannot be blind to costs that do not result in an
increase in their own expenses.339 The district court cautioned
employers that “[w]hile revenue sharing is accepted industrywide as a method of paying for plan recordkeeping services,
the prudence of choosing that option must be evaluated
according to the circumstances of each plan.”340 The employer
also breached duties when it removed low-fee options and
replaced them with higher fee options motivated, at least in
part, by increasing revenue sharing to cover administrative
341
expenses.
Specifically, the court found that the duty of
prudence was violated “(1) when they failed to follow the IPS
when it considered only two viable options for a managed
allocation fund, and (2) failed to engage in a deliberative
assessment of the merits when determining which investment
option to choose.”342
Defined contribution participants’ “choice” in self-directed
plans regarding investment allocation restricts the scope of the
traditional ERISA fiduciary protections under the safe
harbor.343 These cases illustrate the limitations of investor
choice in defined contribution plans and highlight the
continued control exercised by employers and other plan
fiduciaries with significant impact on individual retirement
savings. Employers and other plan fiduciaries exercise
structural control over plans, which warrants oversight but is
difficult to achieve due to the narrow scope of liability for
fiduciaries of defined contribution plans. These cases highlight
the limited grounds on which plaintiffs can raise breach of
fiduciary duty claims in relationship to fees, the lack of a

338. Id. at *10–11.
339. “[W]ithout calculating the dollar amount of the recordkeeping fees, ABB could
not know whether revenue sharing was offsetting or reducing the cost. . . . ABB’s
monitoring of the reasonableness of the overall expense ratio was insufficient because it
does not show how much revenue is flowing, does not show the competitive market for
comparable funds, and fails to take into account the size of the plan.” Mamorsky, supra
note 315, at 1–2.
340. Tussey, 2012 WL 1113291 at *15.
341. Id. at *21 (“[T]he Vanguard Wellington Fund with its low fees, and longstanding consistent performance history, made it a very attractive fund . . . . The Court
believes that the Wellington Fund’s removal was not due to any failure of its merits, but
because the Freedom Funds that replaced it generated more in revenue sharing for
Fidelity Trust.”).
342. Id. at *22.
343. Maher & Stris, supra note 88, at 459 n.129.
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cohesive approach to fees in federal courts, and the impact
structural decisions have on participant options, and in many
cases, their retirement savings outcomes.
VI. SUGGESTED REFORMS AND CONCLUSIONS
Citizen shareholders bear traditional investment risks that all
shareholders face—rising or falling stock market—but citizen
shareholders shoulder those risks in the context of limited
accountability mechanisms. The shift from defined benefit to
defined contribution plans, the emergence of self-directed
retirement accounts, and the resulting dependence on the stock
market, particularly mutual and index funds, created our defined
contribution society where employees bear significant retirement
risks. ERISA’s regulatory framework is not focused on and does not
mitigate these new risks. To help balance these risks borne by
citizen shareholders, ERISA regulations should focus on both
structural and individual reforms.
A. Structural Reforms
Structural reforms focus on how citizen shareholders invest
344
in the market and the regulatory environment protecting them.
The following is a brief discussion of possible structural reforms
including strengthening fiduciary duties for structural plan
decisions, especially those related to fees and expenses,
evaluating the fractured oversight and implementation of
ERISA, and examining the role of intermediaries in self-directed
defined contribution plans. The suggestions provided below are a
starting point for thinking about reforms, a complete discussion
of which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Re-evaluating the substantive barriers to fiduciary duty
oversight is a key area of structural reform. The fee litigation
cases illustrate the control that plan fiduciaries continue to
exercise over self-directed defined contribution plans.345 Since
participant choice is the basis for applying the safe harbor
exemption, structural decisions that restrict and impact
participants’ choice should be subject to the full scope of fiduciary
duties as originally conceived of in ERISA, not the safe harbor
applied to self-directed accounts. This is particularly relevant in
344. For instance, rules promulgated by the IRS regarding automatic enrollment
impact how citizens shareholders invest because they are more likely to invest. And rules
released by the DOL regarding disclosures focus on the regulation of retirement plans.
See infra note 365 (explaining the IRS automatic enrollment rules and DOL disclosure
rules).
345. See supra Part V.C.2 (discussing fee litigation cases).
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light of information asymmetries and financial illiteracy that call
into question participants’ ability to effectively evaluate the impact
that fees have on long-term savings goals.346 High fees, especially
when they serve as a means to offset administrative costs of plan
sponsors (employers), exacerbate these information asymmetries
and the risks borne by participants. Additionally, reliance on openmarket investment alternatives like those offered in open brokerage
window options fail to cure the structural defect or consequence of
high fees. The endorsement bias for the twenty or so funds offered
within a self-directed defined contribution plan make those options,
despite the high fees, attractive to many participants.347 Additional
behavior biases such as inertia, immobilization and
348
make the brokerage window a theoretically
procrastination
unattractive option for many participants who feel ill-equipped to
make investment decisions.349 Brokerage window accounts should
not be allowed to create the illusion of choice and therefore allow
the safe harbor affirmative defense to apply to other structural
decisions.
Another area of structural ERISA reforms for citizen
shareholders involves the fractured oversight of self-directed
defined contribution plans. Three major agencies—the DOL, the
SEC, and the IRS—are tasked with various functions under
ERISA.350 Congress designated the DOL, acting through the
346. See Barr & Diamond, supra note 207, at 8–9.
In the context of pensions, there is ample evidence of poor
information . . . [V]irtually nobody realizes the significance of administrative
charges for pensions . . . [O]ver a full career, an annual management charge of
1 percent of the individual’s accumulation reduces the accumulation (and
hence the pension) by 20 percent.
Id.
347. See Medill, supra note 33, at 335–36 (explaining how investors will reduce
information costs by selecting “heavily marketed, broker-sold investment funds, even
though those funds have higher fees”).
348. “Recent lessons from behavioral economics also yield powerful lessons,
explaining such phenomena as procrastination (people delay saving, do not save, or do
not save enough), inertia (people stay where they are), and immobilization (whereby
conflicts and confusion lead people to behave passively, like a deer in the headlights).”
Barr & Diamond, supra note 207, at 9.
349. Note that there is no current data for the number of self-directed defined
contribution participants who opt for open-brokerage window investment allocations
nor for the amount of money invested in these vehicles relative to all defined
contribution dollars.
350. ERISA regulations govern all benefit plans and the oversight agencies that
implement and enforce ERISA standards. The DOL acts primarily through the Employee
Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) and the U.S. Department of Treasury through
the IRS. KOZAK, supra note 4, at 31. The PBGC, a third regulatory agency over ERISA,
oversees Title IV of ERISA dealing with insurance and guarantees defined benefit plans.
“PBGC was created . . . to encourage the continuation and maintenance of private-sector
defined benefit pension plans, provide timely and uninterrupted payment of pension
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Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA), as the primary
regulatory agency for enforcing ERISA standards related to plan
reporting and disclosures, fiduciary duties, plan administration,
and private enforcement actions.351 The DOL is also responsible for
financial education of employees, a task that is not mandated under
ERISA regulations but serves an important role in the retirement
352
framework, especially for self-directed defined contribution plans.
353
In addition to the IRS, which administers Title II of ERISA, the
SEC regulates the sale and reporting requirements for the
354
investments offered in self-directed defined contribution plans.
Regulatory authority, interpretations and enforcement are spread
across several agencies complicating the process for citizen
355
shareholders as well as employers to navigate. Additionally, the
fractured regulatory landscape reduces the priority that any one
agency can make ERISA policy development, oversight, or
356
enforcement.
The issues addressed in each agency’s silo—workplace,
tax, or securities—have implications in the other arenas as
well. For example, the SEC proposed advertising rule
amendments related to target-date funds, popular mutual fund
products, requiring companies to include the date in the fund
benefits, and keep pension insurance premiums at a minimum.” Who We Are, PBGC,
http://www.pbgc.gov/about/who-we-are.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
351. Medill, supra note 33, at 327. Thus, the EBSA carries out the DOL’s
responsibilities under ERISA Title I. History of EBSA and ERISA, DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/aboutebsa/history.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2012). At the time
of its name change in February 2003, “EBSA was known as the Pension and Welfare
Benefits Administration (PWBA). Prior to January 1986, PWBA was known as the
Pension and Welfare Benefits Program.” Id.
352. See Medill, supra note 33, at 341–42 (discussing the DOL’s role as the primary
agency responsible for financial education of employees and criticisms regarding the
limitations of DOL’s efficacy in that role). Additionally, there are “four federal regulatory
agencies involved in educating the public to save and invest for retirement. In addition to
the DOL, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Department of the
Treasury also have public education initiatives, as does the Social Security
Administration.” Id. at 348 (footnotes omitted).
353. The IRS administers Title II of ERISA, regarding funding, vesting, and
minimum payments as well as overseeing the tax-exempt and tax-deferred components of
pension benefits. KOZAK, supra note 4, at 31, 34. In 1978 President Jimmy Carter issued
an Executive Statement reorganizing jurisdiction under ERISA as between the DOL and
the DOT. Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,713 (1978), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. app. at 297–99 (Supp. II 1976), and in 92 Stat. 3793 (1978); see also KOZAK, supra
note 4, at 33–35.
354. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.
shtml (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
355. See KOZAK, supra note 4, at 32–35 (discussing the various federal agencies with
the authority to issue regulations and interpretations under ERISA).
356. See id. (discussing how the Department of Treasury and DOL may issue regulations
that carry the force of law; however, that does not give priority to one agency over the other).
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name and provide a description of the asset allocation within
the fund.357 The SEC focused on target-date funds because of
the decline of defined benefit pensions and the growth of the
defined contribution society where “Americans are increasingly
responsible for constructing and managing their own
retirement portfolios,” a task that can be “challenging” and
358
require “significant knowledge and commitment of time.” These
additional disclosures, while beneficial, do not address the broader
issue of how to provide employees with comparative disclosures of
their investment options within a given plan in a way that will help
them choose the appropriate investment vehicle and actively
manage their accounts.359 There is little coordination among the
SEC’s advertising rules and the DOL’s investor education programs
or reporting requirements.360 Fractured oversight, implementation,
and enforcement limit the effectiveness of any single agency’s
361
efforts within its individual silo.
The workplace, tax, and
securities policies related to citizen shareholders should be
considered in a dedicated, consolidated agency vested with policy
development,
implementation,
education,
oversight,
and
enforcement of self-directed defined contribution plans.
Another area of potential structural reform may be found in
closely examining the role of institutional investors (i.e., mutual and
index funds) as well as other intermediaries such as investment
brokers and advisors who facilitate citizen shareholders’
investments, who benefit directly from fee arrangements and who
represent the interests of citizen shareholders in the private
securities market. A subsequent article focusing more extensively
on the role of corporate governance and securities statutes will
scrutinize the role of intermediaries in our defined contribution
362
society.
357. Investment Company Advertising: Target Date Retirement Fund Names and
Marketing, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,920 (proposed June 23, 2010) [hereinafter Investment Company
Advertising] (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 270), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2010/33-9126.pdf;
see
also
Investment
Company
Advertising: Target Date Retirement Fund Names and Marketing, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,920
(proposed Apr. 6, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 270), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2012/33-9309.pdf (reopening the comment period in 2012 in
response to an SEC-sponsored survey on TDF disclosures).
358. Investment Company Advertising, supra note 357, at 35,920.
359. See infra text accompanying note 387 (suggesting disclosures should be simplified
and consolidated because too much information can create “noise” ignored by investors).
360. For instance, the DOL released guidelines on its reporting requirements; however,
these guidelines do not incorporate the reporting requirements of the IRS. Reporting and
Disclosure
Guide
for
Employee
Benefit
Plans,
DOL
1
(Oct.
2008),
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/rdguide.pdf.
361. Id.
362. See supra note 34.
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Some risks borne by participants under our defined
contribution society cannot be fully mitigated. Market
performance, for example, is a risk some party in the framework
363
has to bear. Public guarantee options may not be the silverbullet solution when the PBGC is notoriously underfunded.364 The
discussion of shifting risks of self-directed systems that in turn
link individual financial security with the performance of private
securities markets may have application to broader policy
debates such as social security reform and questions of
privatization.
B. Individual Reforms
Reforms focused on the individual participant are needed to
mitigate some of the risks shifted onto citizen shareholders in our
defined contribution society and better prepare participants to
assume the retirement savings responsibility required for
individual and national financial security. Reforms focused on
individuals should tackle several existing deficiencies within the
ERISA framework such as contribution defaults, investor
disclosures, and financial literacy.
To claim that ERISA has been wholly unresponsive to the
retirement revolution and the prevalence of the self-directed
defined contribution plans would be an overstatement. ERISA
has incorporated limited reforms that are intended to ease the
burden of individual management of retirement accounts. These
reforms include automatic enrollment default rules in 401(k)
plans and efforts at reforming participant disclosures.365 The
market has also been somewhat responsive. The evolution of
target date retirement funds was in direct response to the
problem of self-directed defined contribution plans where
participants had no desire and/or confidence in his or her ability
to actively manage retirement savings.366 Target date funds are a
363. See THE PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MONEY AND FINANCE 358 (Newman et al.
eds., 2d ed. 1992) (describing risk as having a “pervasive role in economic life”); see also
supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text (discussing how market performance risk
shifted from employers to employees).
364. See
PBGC,
ANNUAL
REPORT
2012,
at
24
(2012),
http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/2012-annual-report.pdf (stating that the PBGC’s overall
financial position has declined and the deficit increased to $34.38 billion as of September
30, 2012).
365. See MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 63 (“In 1998 and 2000 the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) issued regulations that allow employers to enroll employees
automatically . . . .”); see also Fact Sheet, supra note 187 (providing an overview of new
DOL rules relating to disclosures of plan-related information).
366. Investment Company Advertising, supra note 357, at 35,921 (“Target date
retirement funds . . . are designed to make it easier for investors to hold a diversified portfolio
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“hybrid” fund that allocates investments based upon a risk
formula that is calculated according to an estimated retirement
date (i.e., the target date) of the participant.367 These initial
responses improved the risk balance in participants’ favor, but do
not set the correct balance of risk mitigation and management.
These developments are built upon in the following suggestions
discussed below.
1. Sticky Defaults and Nudges. Self-directed defined
contribution plans may offer a default option of automatic
enrollment, meaning that an employee is automatically enrolled
to participate in the 401(k) with an opt-out option, rather than
368
requiring the employee to opt into the plan to participate.
Automatic enrollment eliminates some of the procrastination
and inertia problems that individuals may have with starting
369
retirement savings. Automatic enrollment does not eliminate
those problems with regard to account management.370 The
default contribution rates and allocations under automatic
enrollment are not ideal for participants and do not
sufficiently mitigate the risks shifted onto them in selfdirected defined contribution plans. Reliance on default
contribution rates and allocations highlight the concept of
“sticky defaults,” where employees do the least to actively
manage their retirement accounts and “stick” in the default
options.371 For example, participants through automatic

of assets that is rebalanced automatically among asset classes over time without the need for
each investor to rebalance his or her own portfolio repeatedly.”).
367. INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at 120. Target date funds are also known as lifestyle
funds. Id. at 235, 240.
368. For a discussion of automatic enrollment in 401(k) plans, see Medill, supra note 33,
at 333.
369. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 65 (“[A]utomatic enrollment has a dramatic
effect on employee participation rates, with the largest increases among groups that benefit the
most: low-income workers.”); see also Sunstein, supra note 148, at 1393 (noting that after
automatic enrollment, 401(k) participation increased even though opting out of it was easy).
370. See Medill, supra note 33, at 333 (explaining that automatic enrollment plans
increase employee participation, but employees usually do not increase their contribution
levels, even when wages are increased).
371.
[T]he problem of sticky defaults explains why participation rates in 401(k) plans can
be improved dramatically by changing the ‘default’ option from nonparticipation to
participation in the plan through an automatic enrollment feature. It also explains
why workers who are automatically enrolled in 401(k) plans tend to ‘stick’ at the
contribution levels assigned by their employers rather than increasing their
contribution levels over time as their wages increase, and tend to remain in the
default investment option assigned by their employers, such as ‘safe’ but low-earning
money market funds.
Id.
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enrollment have lower than average savings “because workers
tend to stay with the low default contribution rates.”372
Participants are also likely to stay in the original asset class
assignment provided with automatic enrollment, which may be a
money market or other low-yield allocation.373
In light of the success of automatic enrollment promoting
participation and the trap of sticky defaults, such as low
contribution rates and low-yield investment allocations,
participants could be provided with other risk-mitigating nudges
in the form of defaults and prompts. For example, contribution
default reforms, with opt-out options, could increase the
minimum savings for most participants by automatically
increasing contribution levels with salary increases or at a
gradual annual rate until a minimum recommended savings level
(i.e., 6% or more) is achieved.
Additionally, requiring annual investment reallocations
could address the problem of assets permanently remaining in
default, low-yield allocations. For example, participants could be
required to reallocate within one year or be placed in a target374
date fund. Additionally participants could be asked to provide a
preferred allocation between asset classes such as money-market
funds, bonds, mutual funds, etc. An employee could opt for 70%
in mutual funds, 20% in bonds, and 10% in money-market funds.
The account would be automatically reallocated annually to
maintain the default asset class diversification specified at
372. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 65. “Several papers have recognized that
default contribution rates that are too low may prevent workers from accumulating enough
retirement wealth, taking advantage of employer-matching contributions, and exploiting the
tax advantages of investing in pension assets.” Lusardi, supra note 183, at 134.
373. MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 91. Money market funds invest in “short-term,
high-grade fixed-income securities, and seek[] the highest level of income consistent with
preservation of capital (i.e., maintaining a stable share price).” INV. CO. INST., supra note 2, at
236. Money market funds have low yields, averaging as low as 0.03% because of low short-term
interest rates. Walter Updegrave, Are Money-Market Accounts and Funds the Same?, CNN
MONEY, (June 13, 2012, 5:17 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/ 06/13/pf/expert/money-marketfunds.moneymag/index.htm.
Money-market funds are designed to maintain a stable price of $1 per share with
each dollar of interest you collect earning you an additional share of the fund.
But there’s no guarantee that a money-fund’s share value won’t sink below $1. And,
in fact, after decades of a nearly flawless record of money funds preserving a $1 per
share value, in September 2008, the Reserve Primary Fund ‘broke the buck,’ or let its
share price slip below $1, after suffering losses on Lehman Brothers debt it owned.
Id.
374. Target date funds can be the default option in automatic enrollment self-directed
defined contribution plans. Craig Copland, Target-Date Fund Use in 401(k) Plans and the
Persistence
of
Their
Use,
2007-2009,
EBRI.ORG,
at
10
(Aug.
2011),
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_08-2011_No361_TDFs.pdf.
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enrollment. This would address the problem of employees staying
in initial asset allocations.375 Additionally this cures situations
where an employee makes an initial investment allocation among
plan investment options but then does not readjust the
allocation balance as certain asset classes earn higher returns
so that over a period of time a 70-20-10 allocation, as described
above, could become a 80-18-2 allocation.
Another individual reform sticky default is an opt-out option
for defined contribution benefits to be converted in whole or in part
to an annuity at the time of retirement, rather than a lump sum
payment. There may be cost advantages available to participants
who purchase annuities at the time of retirement, rather than later
in life, and through a plan, rather than individually. Annuities
would mitigate some of the longevity risks borne by employees as
well as the risks of market performance in retirement years when
investments should be conservative to preserve accumulated
376
savings.
2. Disclosures. Individual reforms must also focus on the
related issues of disclosures and financial literacy. To reform
disclosures without providing participants with the tools to digest
and utilize the information contained in the disclosures is a wasted
effort that may be politically expedient but does little to mitigate
377
The issue of
the risks shifted onto citizen shareholders.
disclosures and financial education are hefty and complicated topics
that warrant their own paper. The following brief discussion of
disclosure and education issues raises some initial areas of reform
and issues to be further considered in a more thorough treatment of
these topics.
ERISA
recently
augmented
participant
disclosure
requirements.378 New regulations require fiduciaries to provide
participants with (1) general plan information about investment
379
options whether or not a brokerage-window is available,
375. See MUNNELL & SUNDÉN, supra note 6, at 93 (suggesting employers offer funds that
adjust periodically according to the participant’s age and risk tolerance level because it is
“particularly important in view of plan participants’ failure to diversify and their inertia with
regard to changing investments over time”).
376. See Zelinksy, supra note 5, at 526. Consider alternatively criticism that “[m]andatory
annuitization may deter some, perhaps many, employees from participating in defined
contribution plans or individual retirement accounts by imposing a restriction they consider
onerous.” Id.
377. See Rodrigues, supra note 112, at 1850 (noting that even though mandating
disclosures is politically easy, recent research suggests disclosures are not enough to influence
investor behavior).
378. See Fact Sheet, supra note 187, at 1–4.
379. Ron Lieber, Seeking Investment Flexibility In a 401(k), N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2011),
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(2) disclosures of fees and expenses charged or deducted from
participant accounts, and (3) load fees and other expenses
associated with account actions.380 In addition, participants will
receive quarterly statements “showing the dollar amount of the
plan-related fees and expenses (whether ‘administrative’ or
‘individual’) actually charged to or deducted from their individual
accounts, along with a description of the services for which the
charge or deduction was made.”381
Disclosures must also include for each investment option
(1) performance data of the prior one-, five-, and ten-year
382
and (2) benchmark data for non-fixed return rate
returns,
options including historical returns of the market over one-, five-,
and ten-year periods.383 Participants also receive information
regarding the total annual operating expenses, “expressed as
both a percentage of assets and as a dollar amount for each
$1,000 invested” and restrictions on additional purchase or
withdraw decisions.384 In addition, all participant disclosures
must include a website address with a glossary of investmentrelated terms to facilitate participant comprehension of disclosed
information and additional investment information.385 The fee
transparency rules promulgated by the DOL correspond to the
SEC Investment Company advertising rules which require sales
materials to contain information not always found in the
prospectus, such as disclosures regarding “investment objectives,
risks, and fees, and to present explanatory information”
prominently as well as include the most recent month-end
386
performance data.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/09/your-money/401ks-and-similar-plans/a-401k-window-tomore-investing-choices-your-money.html?pagewanted=all (“Your employer can simply add
something called a self-directed option, also known as a brokerage or mutual fund window. At
that point, your 401(k) or similar account becomes like a regular brokerage account, where you
can buy any mutual or exchange-traded fund (and in some cases, any individual stock) you
want.”).
380. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-5 (2012); Fact Sheet, supra note 187, at 2.
381. Fact Sheet, supra note 187, at 2.
382. Investment options with fixed rates of return include bonds, CDs, and certain
annuities.
383. Fact Sheet, supra note 187, at 2.
384. Id. at 2–3.
385. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-5 (requiring fiduciaries to disclose a general
glossary of terms to help participants understand investment alternatives or provide
participants with a web address directing them to a glossary of terms).
386. Amendments to Investment Company Advertising Rules, 67 Fed. Reg. 36,712
(May 24, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270, & 274), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8294.htm;
SEC
Amends
Investment
Company
Advertising Rules, FINRA (Jan. 8, 2004), http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/
Guidance/MemberAlerts/2004/p002756.
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Increasing the information that employer sponsors must
provide is the first step in disclosure and education reform. A
second step should focus on simplifying, consolidating, and
translating information into digestible and useable formats
informed by behavioral economics to promote both
comprehension and action. For example, inundation with
mandatory information translates into noise that participants
387
are likely to ignore. Isolated information regarding individual
investment options should be replaced with consolidated
disclosures that provide a comparison among all options in a
plan, as well as market averages for the asset class. For example,
information regarding a TIAA-CREF Growth and Retail Fund
would be compared with other growth-oriented mutual funds
offered in the company’s plan, as well as the market average for
growth funds. This comparison data should include more than
past returns, which are a poor indicator of future performance,388
and should focus on fees and fee sharing arrangements. These
comparisons would place the disclosed information into a context
that would be useful for decision-making and disaggregate
information relevant to investment allocation, especially in the
contained universe of investing within a self-directed defined
contribution plan.389 The DOL and the SEC should also
coordinate on the issue of required disclosures for assets
commonly included in plans so that employers receive the
necessary information from funds, which can then be reported to
the DOL and disclosed to employee participants.
3. Financial Education. An issue closely related to
disclosures is financial education. There is neither mandatory
employer-provided investment education for participants in self390
directed plans,
nor is there a financial literacy curriculum
available in schools, despite the growing number of Americans who
depend, or are likely to depend, on self-directed defined contribution

387. See Rodrigues, supra note 112, at 1854.
388. Mercer, Palmiter & Taha, supra note 147, at 433–34 (“Extensive studies have
found only ‘weak and controversial evidence that past performance has much, if any,
predictive ability for future returns.’ In other words, little evidence of returns persistence
exists; top performing funds generally do not continue to significantly outperform other
funds.” (footnotes omitted)); Travis Sapp & Ashish Tiwari, Does Stock Return Momentum
Explain the “Smart Money” Effect?, 59 J. FIN. 2605, 2607 (2004) (finding that fund flows
into U.S. equity mutual funds “effectively demonstrate[] that fund investors appear to be
chasing recent large returns”).
389. See Rodrigues, supra note 112, at 1852–53 (suggesting that salience of
information is more important than the disclosure itself because “[i]nvestors, including
professionals, have only limited attention to devote to processing information.”).
390. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1 n.1 (2006).
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plans for retirement savings. Of the voluntary programs that
are offered, observers are critical of current investor education
programs offered by the DOL,391 the agency charged with
392
education under ERISA. A primary criticism of the DOL is
that it serves two masters under the ERISA framework:
employer sponsors and employee participants.393 ERISA’s
objective of protecting the rights and benefits of plan
participants also includes avoiding undue administrative
burdens on employers and preserving employers’ right to
394
customize plans. The DOL was placed in a difficult situation
where increased employee education would benefit employees
but burden employer sponsors. Critics have suggested that the
DOL struck a balance in favor of employer cost reduction and
flexibility at the expense of education and employee
protection.395 The current situation is untenable because our
defined contribution society is premised on the ability of
individuals to manage retirement accounts during their
working life and throughout retirement. That premise requires
support for education in the form of a national curriculum or
mandatory employer education.
Of course, investor education is not a cost-free proposition,
and resources dedicated to education reform must be allocated
to effective measures based upon current behavioral economic
396
research. For example, there are
specific segments of the U.S. population—those with low
educational attainment and low income—that save in
very different ways than more educated and affluent
households. It may be important to target these groups

391. See Medill, supra note 33, at 341–45.
392. Congress named the DOL as the lead agency under the SAVER Act. Savings
Are Vital to Everyone’s Retirement (SAVER) Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-92, §§ 3, 111
Stat. 2139, 2139–40 (1997); see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1146–1447 (2006).
393. See Medill, supra note 33, at 344–45 (describing the DOL’s competing goals of
protecting the rights and benefits of plan participants and preserving the rights of
employers).
394. Id. at 345.
395. Id. at 346 (suggesting the DOL’s regulatory provisions were a “compromise
necessary to encourage employers to sponsor participant-directed 401(k) plans,” but
cannot “be reconciled with the need to provide workers with a vigorous and effective
public educator”).
396. Zelinsky, supra note 5, at 526 (“Before mandating such education, we need
rigorous proof that the results are likely to justify the costs. Without such data, a
mandate for employer-provided investor education looks suspiciously like a windfall for
the providers of that mandated education.”); see also supra note 195 and accompanying
text (discussing how a policy based on the providing of information to participants that is
never given, and on the assumption that participants will use information on their own in
ways that they cannot, is a flawed concept).

Do Not Delete

226

9/22/2013 2:49 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[51:1

and devise programs that are better tailored to their
397
needs and barriers to saving.

Additionally, some research suggests that “employerprovided educational materials are geared toward individuals
who are natural ‘planners’ and that these materials do not appeal
to the approximately 50% of the working population that is not
planning-oriented.”398
Whatever education program is developed, it must take into
account the breadth of participants who are given this
responsibility with varying cultural and education backgrounds.
For example at any university, faculty members, administrative
staff in departments like financial aid and admissions, support
staff for faculty and administrators, facilities staff like
housekeeping, and executives of the university all invest in the
same plan. Any education program must take into account these
differences in audience in structuring a meaningful education
tool.
C. Conclusions
How people invest in the stock market has changed as a
result of the retirement revolution from traditional pensions
(defined benefit plans) to self-directed defined contribution plans
like the 401(k). The prevalence of self-directed defined
contribution plans has created a new class of investors—the
citizen shareholders—who enter the securities market through
retirement plans, invest for long-term savings goals, and are
predominantly indirect shareholders. The policy shift pushed
investors into the markets to save for the individually crucial and
socially important goal of retirement financial security. Citizen
shareholders are the fastest growing group of investors, but they
have limited protections under corporate law, securities
regulations, and ERISA.
Citizen shareholders do not fit within the traditional
corporate law framework of shareholder rights because their
indirect ownership status dilutes their information and voting
rights, as well as exacerbates their rational apathy as diffuse and
disempowered “owners.” The problems of indirect ownership are
intensified in the context of employer-provided plans where
investors’ choice to enter the market is constrained as is their
ability to exit and secure adequate representation by mutual
fund managers. Secondly, citizen shareholders are largely
397.
398.

Lusardi, supra note 183, at 141.
Medill, supra note 33, at 338–39.
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excluded from the original protections and safeguards offered
under ERISA. Citizen shareholders bear the risk of market
performance, account funding, longevity, and information risks—
risks not borne by retirees under defined benefit plans. Third,
because citizen shareholders exercise control over their
investments by allocating savings into various pre-selected
investment options, employer sponsors and other plan fiduciaries
can claim a safe harbor affirmative defense against most liability.
The safe harbor protects fiduciary breaches from liability and in
many cases shields important structural plan decisions such as
investment fees and options that significantly impact citizen
shareholders’ control over their accounts.
In this Article, I call attention to the retirement revolution
and the resulting defined contribution society. If participants
bear the ultimate risk, then they should be both fully informed as
to the risks and equipped to manage them. I suggest reforms that
mitigate and balance risks assumed by employee participants
under our defined contribution society with structural reforms
like augmented fiduciary duties for structural plan decisions and
individual reforms focused on utilizing defaults, comparisonbased disclosures and increased financial literacy programs.

